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FOREWORD

The new sub-title 'A Quarterly of Catholic Thought and of Monastic History' does not indicate any change of policy. The sub-title previously in use with its reference to Theology and Metaphysics served its purpose in drawing attention to our chief concern : 'the fuller understanding of human experience and of God's Revelation to us in Christ and his Church'. But it could not avoid a suggestion of abstruseness, and the time has come for it to be replaced by something shorter and simpler.

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THE MASS AND THE PASSION

By MGR H. FRANCIS DAVIS

THANKS to Dom Iltyd Trethowan, English theologians have now been introduced to Canon Masure's inspiring interpretation of the Mass in its relation to the Passion. I was especially delighted to see his book appear a few years ago¹ in English, as I had since about 1934 been basing my own lectures on his little volume. Not only did he seem to provide a simple and valuable formula in which to express all that seemed best and most certain in Tradition and most helpful in devotion, but he seemed to show us the way to use and reconcile all that was valuable in the researches of Frs De La Taille and Lepin, Cardinal Billot and Abbot Vonier. Surely a new stage in eucharistic theology has been reached, and we have all agreed to reject certain false trails of post-reformation polemics.

The Thomistic and Augustinian formula, that the Mass is a Sacrament of Calvary, is the one favoured by Canon Masure. This has always seemed to me to express most simply and most happily what all agree in stressing, the close connexion between the Mass and the Cross. One difficulty in the way of its general acceptance springs from the modern theological practice of applying the word *Sacrament* exclusively to the seven sacraments in so far as they are God's instruments, symbolizing and effecting grace in our souls. Canon Masure and others today remind us that in St Augustine's day the word had a far wider connotation, and was legitimately used not only of channels of grace between God and man, but also of symbols expressing man's worship of God. In other words, just as the water of baptism contains and signifies the spiritual washing of the soul, and the consecrated host contains and signifies Christ's Body

¹ E. Masure, *The Christian Sacrifice*, translated by Dom Iltyd Trethowan, Burns Oates, 1944.

as the food of our souls, so the Mass contains and signifies the sacrifice which Christ, as our Head, offered for us on Calvary. Thus, just as all the value of the water of baptism comes from the humanity of Christ, who suffered for us, so all the value of the Mass as a sacrifice comes from the Passion and Death of Christ, which it represents and in a certain sense contains.

The first obvious advantage of this formula, besides its simplicity, is that it makes clear that the Mass *is*, for us, Calvary, and so turns our minds away from itself to the Cross. This indeed is the purpose of the Mass—to bring the mystery of Christ's Redemption on to our altars, and so to make the Cross the focus of our religion. Pope Pius XII's encyclical on the Liturgy recalls the words of Trent, that the purpose of the Mass is (a) to give us a visible sacrifice ; (b) to represent the one sacrifice of the Cross, so that its memory would remain until the end of time, and its effects be applied to the remission of our daily sins.

It is not a mere sign of Calvary. For in that case it would not *be* for us Calvary. It contains what it signifies. Calvary is there. *We* can now unite ourselves to it. This is what is new about the Mass, that it transfers us to the sphere of Calvary. This is done, not merely to remind us of Calvary, still less to enable Christ to act more easily upon us, least of all to enable Christ to do something that he failed to do adequately on Calvary. Clearly, in so far as it is a sacrifice, it is meant to give us the opportunity of making our contribution. What is that contribution ? Not something which will add to the value of the Cross, nor something lacking in Christ's infinite sacrifice, nor the perfecting of his all-sufficient work of Redemption. It is our performance of our duty of sacrifice ; which is only done by offering his sacrifice.

But it is not alone that we offer. The members cannot act apart from the Head. Christ, who offered Calvary nineteen hundred years ago, offers it now, but in a

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different way. This way is called an unbloody way, a mystical way, or a sacramental way.

There are one or two points in Canon Masure's filling out of this concept, that I would like to discuss with him, and with the readers of THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW.

For a long while, I thought that the next stage of Canon Masure's argument was his identification, for all intents and purposes, of the *sacrifice* with the *victim* on whom the sacrificial actions have been performed. Christ is the victim who offered himself to suffer and to die, and who was received in glory by his Father as an infinitely pleasing sacrifice on behalf of mankind. If this *victim* is made really present on the altar, we must say that the *sacrifice* is really present, since it is unreal and sacrificially unmeaning to distinguish the sacrifice from the victim. When this victim is really present on the altar, the sacrifice of Calvary, together with the immolation of Calvary, is really present, in so far as the victim in his stage of glory, after having passed through the stage of immolation, is truly there.

This is the way I understood Canon Masure. And I went on to argue that the Mass must be a real sacrifice, because it really contained a sacrifice, i.e. the sacrificial victim in his present stage of apotheosis. It would, however, have been just as real if the victim were present in his stage of immolation, as would have been the case if Mass had been celebrated at the moment of Christ's death on the Cross.¹ All that is necessary is to have the victim present, together with the virtue which flows from that victim, and virtually you have all the victim's sacrifice ; in fact, according to an old terminology, you have the sacrifice really.

But Canon Masure does not look upon the Mass as simply the sacrifice of the Cross really present ; it is a sacrament of that sacrifice. In other words, not only

¹ This is clearly much influenced by Abbot Vonier's manner of expressing this theory in his *Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist*.

does it *contain* the sacrifice of Calvary, it also signifies and applies it. This signification, if it is to be after the manner of other New Testament sacraments, will be symbolic, i.e. it will not be purely arbitrary.

At this point, I seem to have filled out Canon Masure's theory with a traditional explanation, which I now see perhaps never belonged to it. I sought and found this symbolism in the placing of Christ's Body upon the altar under the signs of his death. These signs or symbols were the Bread and Wine as representing, separately, the Body and the Blood, as though the Blood had flowed from the Body. There was no difficulty in seeing that the Mass not only symbolized and contained the sacrifice of the Cross, but also applied it, since the Church had always believed both that we offer a worthy sacrifice in union with Christ at the Mass, and that the Mass was the means of our obtaining the blessings of Calvary.

This was the simple outline of Canon Masure, according to my interpretation. The Mass is a *sacrifice*, because it really contains a sacrifice, i.e. the victim of Calvary who has passed through all the stages of sacrifice and has entered the Holy of Holies once for all time. It is a *sacrament* in so far as it signifies and symbolizes Calvary. It is a *sacrament* further in so far as it applies Calvary in the two directions, man to God and God to man. It is *our* sacrifice, in so far as we join ourselves with Christ in the movement from man to God.

It will soon be seen that I misunderstood Canon Masure. He has shown this most clearly in a recent article in THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW, which I shall consider below.

One weakness in the theory as so far exposed is that it fails to make clear how and when Christ performs an act of *offering* during Mass. Christ is there. His sacrifice is there. Its commemoration is there. But does he here and now *offer* sacrifice? I used to suppose that he can be said to offer the sacrifice of the Mass in

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so far as, by his ordination, the sacrifice of the Cross is made sacramentally present.

Fr Lepin is the modern theologian who most stresses the need of discovering in the Mass some action which can be said to be Christ's high priestly offering of today's sacrifice. He thought he had found it in the fact that, since Christ is forever continuing his offering in heaven, he has only to be made present on the altar for that heavenly offering to be present at our Mass. The heavenly offering was not essentially different from the offering on the Cross, for Christ's offering of himself is unceasing. It began when he was born, and continues for eternity. The obvious difficulty of this theory for a Thomist is that it seems to take the Mass out of the sacramental or ritualistic order and place it in the same order as the Cross itself. In this respect, Lepin's explanation seems out of harmony with his usual support of the distinction of order between personal and ritualistic sacrifices.

My first effort to solve this problem and show how Christ was the offerer of the Mass, in such a way as to save the sacramental theory as above outlined, was to say that Christ offers himself *through* his ministers. Is it not true to the sacramental order that Christ should act through visible earthly ministers? Fr Lepin's theory made Christ's offering during Mass a personal offering direct to God, whereas he should have made it an offering through his earthly priests. Could we do better here than quote the words that Pius XII takes from St John Chrysostom, that Christ borrows the priest's tongue, and uses the priest's hands? Through these Christ places himself, the real victim of Calvary, upon the altar under the figures of his death. Is not this the same as saying that he offers himself sacramentally—in *sacramento*, says St Augustine—under the figures of his death? This fits in with the mode of speech of the Fathers, when they say that on the altar Christ immolates himself

figuratively. He is really there. But his immolation is a sacramental one, under figures or symbols, which nevertheless contain the real victim. As Pius XII says, 'the sacrificing of our Redeemer is shown on the altar in a wonderful way by means of external signs, which are the signs (*indices*—perhaps "figures") of his death'. Afterwards he adds: '. . . the eucharistic species, under which he is present, figure that bloody separation of Body and Blood'.

Thus the sacrifice of Christ is really present, but in addition we say that Christ truly—though sacramentally—*offers* that sacrifice through his priests, when he places himself on the altar under the appearances of his death.

This way of explaining how the sacrament of the Cross is offered by Christ is, I think, the common way today. But it has been pointed out to me that Canon Masure has another way of explaining how Christ offers himself in the Mass, even in his original book.¹ It consists in the priest offering to God first-fruits of the gifts God has given to man, i.e. bread and wine, with a view to their being consecrated to him and so to obtaining that acceptance which transforms them into the victim of Calvary. The bread and wine are the signs of our sacrifice, in which we fulfil our duty of making a visible sacrifice, and of assimilating ourselves to Christ. The sign of our sacrifice becomes the sign of Christ's sacrifice at the consecration, and at that moment the two sacrifices (i.e. ours and his) become one. The whole rite, comprising the offering of our sacrifice of bread and wine to be accepted and transformed into Christ's sacrifice, can be regarded as a sacramental offering of Christ's passion. Why? Because Christ made it so at the last supper, when he also took bread and wine, and offered them to God that they might be transubstantiated into the victim of the morrow under the signs of his death. Christ has ordained that, every time we do likewise,

¹ See *The Christian Sacrifice*, pp. 198 ff.

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it is the Church, Christ's Body, that does it in his name. Since he made the Last Supper a sacrament containing all the value of Calvary together with its real victim, we can say that he made the Last Supper a sacramental offering of Calvary. So also in the Mass the Church offers sacramentally the sacrifice of Calvary. But since the Church does it in obedience to Christ's command in the cenacle, and since the Church is one with Christ, it is right to say that Christ offers the sacramental sacrifice of the Mass through the ministry of his priests.

If this correctly represents Canon Masure's position, the first thing that occurs to me is how near his view is to that of Suarez, rejected by him. I agree that Suarez has a different theory as to the essence of sacrifice, but that does not seem to affect the present question.

Like Canon Masure, Suarez says that the sacrifice of the Mass has a moral meaning in common with all sacrifices, that it is a sign of our interior worship and recognition of God's honour, and of our gratitude and contrition. Secondly, he says that it is meant to recall the passion of Christ. Thirdly, he says, again I think in agreement with Canon Masure, that the principal thing offered to God is Christ, the lamb of God, our Pasch. But this, says Suarez, is only so by virtue of the consecration. Christ, he says, is the thing offered, in so far as he is the term of our act of offering, not that he is the matter on which our action is focused. 'Christ is the thing offered in this sacrifice, as consecrated through the act of transubstantiation ; as such, he is the *terminus ad quem* of such an action, and by means of it he becomes present under the sacramental species.'¹ However, he says, our sacrificial action must be exercised about a visible object. The visible object is the bread and wine, surrendered to God that they may become the Body and Blood of Christ offered by us under visible forms. But, argues Suarez, since it only becomes a sacrifice

¹ Suarez, Op. Omnia, XXI, Paris, 1861, p. 651.

when it is consecrated by the priest speaking in the name of Christ, we must say that it is Christ who offers the sacrifice of the Mass.

Suarez uses different terminology, as he is writing for a scholastic audience. But is there any real distinction between Suarez's view, as here expressed, and that of Canon Masure? It is enlightening to note that the objections made to Suarez at the time were similar to those brought up against Canon Masure today. Thus, it was objected that Suarez made of the Mass a kind of double sacrifice (a) the sacrifice of bread and wine and (b) the sacrifice of Christ under the forms of bread and wine. Like Canon Masure, Suarez regarded the mystical immolation (involving the presence together of two species) as secondary, and perhaps not absolutely necessary for the sacrifice of the Mass, which consisted in the transubstantiation.

Obviously, to say that Canon Masure's theory is like that of Suarez is no condemnation of it. Perhaps it is a commendation. But it makes one wonder why he objected to Suarez's theory on the grounds that the latter made the Mass a fresh immolation of bread.¹ Suarez explicitly insists that the Mass is a sacrifice because it contains Christ as the principal offerer, Christ under the species of bread and wine as victim, God as the one to whom it is offered, and the Church and faithful on whose behalf it is offered. He also insists that it is an immolation, because it is a sacrament of an immolation.

But can we be satisfied with this explanation? Does it sufficiently explain the traditional phrase 'Christ offers himself (or his passion or his death) to the Father in a sacramental (unbloody) way through his priests'? Is not this merely the Church offering bread and wine (the symbols of our sacrifice) to be changed by God's power into the victim of Calvary? When the Fathers stress the identity of offerer, is it enough to say that,

¹ *The Christian Sacrifice*, p. 223.

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when we offer bread and wine, it counts as Christ's offering of himself, because God accepts the Church's offering and transforms it into the victim of Calvary? Here the *Church* does something about the bread, and *God* transforms it, but what does *Christ* do as man? Christ as man seems to do nothing in such a case, except in so far as his Church does something in his name, which is rewarded by his presence.

Would not all the value of Canon Masure's sacramental theory be saved, if we regard all our actions about the bread and wine as no more than signs of our anxiety to join our sacrifice as members to the sacrifice of Calvary? Our sacrifice is taken over—and becomes the sacrifice of the Mass—at the moment of consecration, when the priest, lending his voice to Christ, does two things: (a) he lets himself be the instrument of God (possibly through the higher instrumentality of Christ's humanity) to bring about the presence of the victim; and (b) he lets himself be the instrument of Christ's humanity in placing that humanity on the altar as a sacramental sacrifice on our behalf, recalling and applying the personal and bloody sacrifice of Calvary and presenting it to the Father together with our personal sacrifice.¹ This personal sacrifice of ours was of course made when we offered up bread and wine; but it is not the sacrifice of Christ until both consecrations have been completed. Only then is the sacrifice of the Mass a reality. Failing that, we cannot say that the sacrifice of the Mass has even begun.

I said that the priest as the instrument of Christ places Christ's humanity on the altar in such a way as to recall and apply the personal and bloody sacrifice of Calvary. Recalling means commemorating. Everyone agrees that the Mass is a commemoration of the passion and death. Perhaps there is less clearness as to the way in which

¹ Cf. *Theological Studies*, Woodstock, Md., U.S.A., Vol. VIII, No. 2. Article by J. P. Haran, S.J. *Minister Christi Sacerdos*, pp. 268ff.

it commemorates. Every Liturgy has its *Anamnesis*. That prayer usually recalls the Passion, Resurrection and Ascension. Rarely, if ever, does it tell us what there is about the sacramental ceremony which reminds us of any of these mysteries. Is it perhaps an arbitrary symbolism? A two-minute silence in memory of those who have fallen in war is arbitrary. There is nothing about that short silence that is like their heroism and death. I suppose it is conceivable that our Lord instituted the Eucharist as an arbitrary sign of his death. However I cannot imagine any theologian defending such a theory. It is characteristic of our Saviour that he chooses apt symbols for his sacraments.

It is from an article by Canon Masure in a recent number of THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW¹ that I realize fully how Canon Masure finds this symbolism in the actual transubstantiation. I still think his view somewhat outside of the main tradition. For a long while theologians seemed agreed to find the likeness to the passion in the apparent separation of the Blood from the Body, brought about by the double consecration. Canon Masure prefers to see this symbolism in the change of our sacrificial gifts of bread and wine into Christ's Body and Blood. The Church makes a sacrifice of bread and wine. These gifts represent herself and her desire to surrender herself through Christ to God. God accepts them, and shows his acceptance by transubstantiating them into Christ's sacrifice. The change of bread and wine into the glorious victim of the Cross symbolizes the real death and glorification of that victim. Offering and transubstantiation signify death and resurrection.

It is not sound to reject this on the grounds that it makes the Mass a sacrifice of bread and wine, as we explained above when dealing with Suarez's view. For the sacrifice of bread and wine does not become the

¹ July 1947.

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Christian sacrifice until it is transformed by God into Christ's Body and Blood.

The biggest difficulty I feel about this view is its apparent novelty. It may be the same as that of Suarez, but is it found before that time? I am aware that a case might be made for its being the view underlying some prayers of the ancient liturgies. But it is not clear that those liturgies anywhere attempt to show what feature of the Mass *recalls* Calvary.

Canon Masure thinks that the common view of the symbolic separation of Blood from Body is not really that of St Thomas. A further study of St Thomas convinces me that Canon Masure has here misunderstood him. There are some passages where St Thomas speaks as though the Blood merely expressed the Passion more than the Body. But the context of these is a discussion of the propriety of referring to the sacrifice when consecrating the wine, rather than when consecrating the bread. I think he explains himself clearly in 4 Sent., d.8, q.2, sol. 1, ad 2. He writes: '... since the sacrament of the Eucharist is a recalling of the Lord's passion, only that which is subject¹ to the passion is mentioned in the consecration of Christ's Body; whereas the *mystery* of the passion is represented in the consecration of the Blood—for his Blood is not separated from his Body save through his passion—and so the conditions of the Lord's passion are expressed by the words following the consecration of the Blood better than by those after the consecration of the Body'. Similarly he writes in the *Summa* (3-78-3, ad 2): 'The Blood consecrated apart expressly represents Christ's passion; and the effect of that passion is rather mentioned in the consecration of the Blood than in the consecration of the Body, which is that which is subjected to the passion.'

¹ Reading *subiectum*, as in the MSS. The reading of the editions, *substantia*, does not make sense.

The translation here and in the following quotations is mine.

This is shown by our Lord's words: "which is delivered for you"; as much as to say: "which is subjected to the passion for you."'

In other passages St Thomas shows that he regards the separated consecration as having this meaning. Thus in 4 Sent., d.11, q.2, a.1, sol.1, he says: 'In this sacrament the passion of Christ is signified, wherein his Blood was separated from his Body, and so the sign of the Body must be offered separately from the sign of the Blood'. So, when St Thomas, in the passage quoted by Canon Masure, says that the Blood more expressly represents the passion, he means that the passion is not fully represented as long as the victim-Body alone is there. The appearance of the Body does not tell us what that Body suffered until the Blood appears separately beside it. Remember that St Thomas is thinking of the words of consecration, which have to be pronounced over the bread and wine separately, and he is deciding which, taken separately, best represents what really they properly signify only when both together.

In 3-76-2, ad 1, he writes: 'Although the whole Christ is under each species, yet it is not useless (to consecrate both). For this serves to represent the passion of Christ, in which the Blood was separated from the Body; and for this reason in the form of consecration of the Blood there is mention of its shedding.' Again in 3-80-12, ad 3: 'The representation of the Lord's passion takes place in the consecration of this sacrament, in which one may not consecrate the Body without the Blood'.

I do not think this symbolism was new in the Middle Ages. Is not this the main point of St Cyprian's argument that it is necessary to have wine, otherwise the Blood will not be seen in the chalice? Is not this the meaning of St Gregory of Nazianzus? 'But, most reverend friend, cease not both to pray and to plead for me when you draw down the Word by your word, when with

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bloodless cutting you sever the Body and Blood of the Lord, using your voice for the glaive.' (Ep. 171.)

Of course it cannot be denied that liturgically the offertory of the bread and wine have their great importance as a focus for our own public and private offering of ourselves to God in union with Christ. Liturgically we offer Mass by offering ourselves through our gifts, knowing that these gifts will be transubstantiated into Christ's sacrifice. But, while admitting the full value of this liturgical feature, is it not more in accordance with St Thomas and the earlier tradition to see the special sacrament of Christ's Blood shed in sacrifice in the separate consecration of first the Body, and then the Blood apart?

Briefly, I propose to the readers of THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW that Canon Masure's sacramental theory corresponds in its central ideas to the ancient Augustino-Thomist tradition, and is therefore supremely worthy of our close attention. But it is just in those points where he seems to leave that tradition, i.e. in his explanation of the actual *offering* of the Mass and of its sacrificial and symbolic *recalling* of Calvary, that it is not easy to follow him. Moreover, by keeping in these matters to tradition, we harmonize his views more easily with most other great eucharistic theologians of our century.

Dom Illtyd Trethowan writes:

All readers of Canon Masure's work must be most grateful to Mgr Davis for pointing out so clearly the points in which the Canon's views differ from those of most modern theologians and for his exposition of St Thomas's teaching on the symbolism of the separated species—an exposition which I would not venture to question. It will be generally agreed, I think, that in *Le Sacrifice du Chef* Canon Masure leaves this aspect of St Thomas's thought on one side in his anxiety to rule out the theory which finds either a real destruction or

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a symbolic representation of a destruction bound up with the essence of sacrifice. I share, and I believe Mgr Davis shares, this anxiety. In the passage of *Theological Studies* to which Mgr Davis has referred us¹ the writer remarks, that 'the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass lies in the double consecration,' adding in a footnote that this is the 'common teaching of theologians': it is this regular emphasis on the *double* consecration in which Canon Masure sees the reflexion of the destruction theory.

He denies, then, that the separation of the species explains why the Mass is a sacrifice. He also denies that the separation is the essential *symbol* of Christ's sacrifice on Calvary, and prefers to find this in the co-presence of the elements within the general sacrificial context of the liturgy. But he does not deny that this separation is a part of the symbolism. 'It has reduced to its own limits', he writes (in the article mentioned by Mgr Davis²) 'a far richer symbolism of which it should be only an element'. He finds both the essence and the symbolism of the Mass 'condensed' in the moment of transubstantiation, because he regards the essence as the placing of the eternal immolation of Christ beneath the sign of our symbolic sacrifice of bread and wine (a sacrifice which becomes *the* sacrifice of the Mass by becoming the eternal unchangeable victim), and because he regards the whole liturgical structure of the Mass, symbolizing this offering of ours, its acceptance and the fruits of this acceptance, as summed up, brought to a point, at the consecration. It is not because it is the memorial of a destruction that the Mass is a sacrifice. It is a sacrifice and the sacrifice of Christ because it is that sacrifice in a sacrament, because it contains the consummated victim under the visible form of our offerings and applies to us the fruits of Calvary. To offer sacrifice is to make a *sign*. Our sign, our bread and wine, become the accepted

¹ Vol. VIII, No. 2, p. 269.

² THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW, July 1947, p. 204.

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victim of the sacrifice offered on Calvary. At the moment of their definitive offering, which is also the moment of their acceptance, they are the sign of the Christian sacrifice, the sign of our union with Christ. The separateness of the species, then, a subsidiary symbol of Christ's death, is not the sign in which the Christian sacrifice consists.

So far, I suggest, the only explicit difference between Mgr Davis and Canon Masure lies in the degree of importance which they assign to the separateness of the species in the symbolic significance of the Liturgy. There are perhaps indications that they do not approach the general economy of the Redemption from quite the same angle, but there is substantial agreement about the essence of the Christian sacrifice. But Mgr Davis wishes to add something to this account. It is the traditional teaching, he tells us, that in the Mass Christ offers himself in a sacramental way, whereas in Canon Masure's view it would seem that the offering, in so far as sacramental, is the offering of the priest as the Church's representative. It is not enough to say that the priest speaks in the name of Christ and by Christ's ordinance and that he is empowered by Christ to consecrate. We must say further that the priest is the instrument of Christ's humanity in recalling and applying the personal sacrifice of Calvary. Canon Masure, I believe, faced by Mgr Davis's question 'What does Christ do as man?' would make his own the conclusions reached by Dr William Moran in a remarkable article in *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record* for November 1942. They do not seem to me to have attracted the attention which they deserve, and I therefore repeat them here. According to the patristic tradition in general, Dr Moran holds, and according to St John Chrysostom in particular, Christ may be called the principal offerer of the Mass 'in somewhat the same way as he is the principal minister of the sacraments' (p. 332). The actual offerer of the

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Mass, on behalf of the Church and by the power of Christ, is the priest (p. 331). The post-Tridentine theologians depart from tradition in maintaining that 'Christ personally intervenes somehow in every Mass', and Suarez is 'the most influential protagonist' of this view (p. 332). His formula '*actu offert Christus hoc sacrificium licet per ministrum*' led to the doctrine, which has since become the common one, that Christ is the immediate offerer (p. 333). 'The extremely slender foundation on which it rests' was pointed out by P. de la Taille (p. 334). Dr Moran's concluding paragraph must be quoted in full :

It is a curious fact that this one alternative view, with so little foundation either in Scripture or Tradition, has enjoyed for quite a long period an almost complete monopoly of the field in two important respects. It has been the starting-point for nearly all discussions of the value and fruits of the Mass in our theological text-books; and it has been the basis of nearly all popular expositions of the Mass. In both cases it has brought complication and difficulty into questions that were simple and easily intelligible before. It has done so by making the Mass a dual sacrifice with two actual offerers—the sacrifice of the Church and the personal sacrifice of Christ simultaneously. The alternative view has been so completely shut out until very recently, that few people realized that that there was an alternative view. Compilers of text-books on the value and fruits of the Mass may be expected to give a less one-sided presentation of the subject in future; for de la Taille's work is too important to be ignored. The question of popular expositions of the Mass is a more delicate one. The faithful have been so long taught to look on the Mass as a sacrifice offered immediately by Christ himself, that some people may fear that the faithful would be scandalized, if they were told that during the greater

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part of the Church's history the Mass was looked at as the sacrifice of Christ's Mystical Body—not a decapitated body, but a body united to its head, and energized by the vitality and priestly power of that head. Others again may think that an exposition of the Mass on the lines of pre-Reformation tradition is not only likely to be more intelligible to the faithful, but also more calculated to give them a deep personal interest in the Mass, by showing them their own part in it, and their responsibility for pulling their weight, so to speak, in the combined effort of the whole Mystical Body to make the Mass as fruitful as possible. As to the respective merits of these two view-points I offer no opinion. Those having the care of souls are in a better position than I am to form an opinion as to the best course to adopt.

In referring at such length to Dr Moran's article I do not wish to suggest that Mgr Davis's view is the text-book view which Dr Moran criticizes. But it is difficult to see how it differs from the view which Dr Moran attributes to Suarez. Mgr Davis, on the other hand, interprets Suarez otherwise, and considers that Canon Masure's view on this question is identical with that of Suarez.

He also considers that Canon Masure's view is identical with that of Suarez as regards the function of transubstantiation in the general theory of the Mass. It is perhaps worth pointing out that in the eighth edition of *Le Sacrifice du Chef* (1944) Canon Masure has placed a double question-mark against the name of Suarez in his table of those who misconceive the function of transubstantiation (p. 276; p. 223 in the English translation, the point criticized as inconsistent by Mgr Davis), and that in the second edition (from which the English translation was made) he had already suggested that Suarez's view on this question was not so far from his own as it might at first sight appear (*The Christian Sacrifice*, pp. 245-5).

Mgr Davis replies:

I am grateful to Dom Illtyd for his constructive criticism of my article. He is right in thinking that we all agree in not wanting to find any kind of destruction in the Mass. In my case, this is not merely because destruction is not bound up with the essence of sacrifice, but also because the Mass is not a sacrifice in its own right, but merely a sacramental or relative sacrifice.

I agree with Dom Illtyd that a sacrifice is the making of a sign. But I would add that a sacramental sacrifice is the making of a sign of the original independent sacrifice. The Mass is a sacrifice in so far as it represents, contains and applies Calvary in such a way that we can unite ourselves with Calvary. Hence, I would say, the Mass is making a sign of Calvary about the Victim of Calvary to enable us to join with Calvary, and for the reception of its fruits. To my understanding the only sign made about the victim is the sign of the separation of Blood from Body. Canon Masure adds transubstantiation, and perhaps more of the liturgical symbolism. Is transubstantiation strictly speaking a sign at all, since we cannot see it? And in any case, is it a sign about the victim, since it is about bread and wine? Is it not rather the means of rendering the victim really present? And is not the rest of the symbolism meant to help us to make Christ's sacrifice offered upon the altar our own?

So that I would agree with Canon Masure that the separation of the species does not make the Mass a sacrifice in its own right. But this separation is the sacrament of Calvary, and therefore makes the Mass a sacramental sacrifice by divine institution.

Dom Illtyd says that transubstantiation is the sign of our union with Christ. I prefer to understand it as the sign of our union in offering, whereas Communion is the sign of the union that results from that offering.

With regard to the second part of Dom Illtyd's note, there is no space here to discuss Dr Moran's excellent

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article. All I want to insist on is that Christ, the Head, *in some sense* offers the Mass. I am not at all certain that he offers it physically. It may be sufficient—I cannot make up my mind on this yet—to say that the priest offers it in Christ's name, when he places Christ on the altar under the sacrament of his death. But surely it is the sacrifice of the Head. Is it not more true to tradition to say that the Church offers *in union with Christ* now what Christ offered for her on Calvary, than simply to say the Church offers now what Christ offered then? To say that Christ is the principal offerer of the Mass is certainly patristic tradition.

MR DAWSON'S GIFFORD LECTURES¹

By THE ABBOT OF DOWNSIDE

MR DAWSON'S Gifford Lectures take as their starting-point the breakdown of the reign of Natural Theology after the humanistic period, and the diversion of interest from the traditional proofs of God's existence to the science of comparative religion, pursued in the light of the idealistic conviction that history is the progressive self-revelation of the Absolute Spirit. The ideal of the new science was impartial objectivity and docility to the evidence, but in fact it tended to borrow its scale of values from the philosophers. On the other hand, the influence of the natural sciences led it to concentrate on the external phenomena of religious history and to neglect what William James called 'the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character', which he held to be the matrix of religion and the source of its dynamic. Since James religion has become an object of study for the psychologists, and in particular for Jung and his disciples; and religious thinkers are faced with the contrast between the interior world of religious profundities that are 'incapable of rational demonstration' and the exterior order of measurable 'scientific' fact that seems empty of religious significance. Here is the antinomy that faces modern man, and unless it can be solved nothing can prevent a world-wide human catastrophe. The divorce between the *psyche* and reason is 'abnormal, unnatural and morbid'; the world-religions, with their outward manifestations and rational claims on the one hand, and their spiritual power, their inspiration, on the other, have been the 'keystones of the world cultures'.

Those who are familiar with Mr Dawson's writings

¹ *Religion and Culture* (The Gifford Lectures of 1947) By Christopher Dawson. Pp. 225 (Sheed and Ward) 10s. 6d.

will recognize here one of his favourite topics. But at this point he proceeds to claim that an understanding of the historic role of religion and of 'how religion asserts its internal spiritual autonomy and how it is moulded and conditioned' by its environment is a necessary preliminary to the science of natural theology. I cannot understand why such a claim is made (except of course that it conveniently brings the subject of Mr Dawson's lecture under the Gifford rubric), or how it could be substantiated. Natural theology is a branch of metaphysics, and though it requires for its great demonstration an admitted fact it is—I should have supposed—supremely indifferent to the nature of that fact, and therefore to the special lessons of history. It undertakes to show that *if anything exists* God exists; and—on the same hypothesis—to catalogue all we can know about God apart from revelation. It is not easy to see what a historical understanding of religion can teach us in this matter, more than we can learn from the fall of a leaf, the beating of our heart, or the flux of consciousness. It can, indeed, give psychological support to our assent to the arguments of natural theology, by showing us that historical man does in fact tend to believe what natural theology teaches. Such support is psychologically valuable, though logically unnecessary—since the conclusions of natural theology are either certain in themselves or else invalid. Historical study can further bring home to us—and who has shown this better than Mr Dawson himself?—that unless religion is true human beings are most miserable; and that unless it is strong, civilization is rotten. But such considerations do not prove religion's truth; they only emphasize the relevance of the religious question. A historical study of religion can also show us the constituent elements of man's religious 'experience' and thus enable us to build up the empty form of 'religion as such'—as, for instance that 'all religion is based on the recognition of

a superhuman Reality of which man is somehow conscious and towards which he must in some way orientate his life'. But it seems to me that these lessons from the history of religion are less valuable to the student of natural theology than they are in the approach to revealed religion. They show us the sort of needs that a divine revelation, if granted, may be expected to satisfy, and the kind of form which a supernatural religion may be expected to assume. Thus it may be possible to make out a strong case, from the historical study of religion, for the view that religion claims to relate man by revelation and grace (or, as we might say, incarnationally) to the transcendent Reality; that religion is typically at once institutional, critical and mystical; that it is both a personal 'experience' and a corporate tradition; that, in order to maintain this dual character of a common boon and a personal enrichment, it must be dogmatic and therefore infalliblistic. To all this natural theology appears to me to be quite indifferent. But as a criterion of the claims of extant historical religions it is all invaluable. It enables us, for instance, to conclude on inspection that whereas the religion of the Catholic Church realizes the 'specific nature of the religious phenomenon' with supreme adequacy, that of the Protestant sects is condemned by the very reasons they allege for their rejection of the Catholic claims. Similarly it may enable us to infer that the reasons that impelled Judaism to reject the Christian revelation are reasons for accepting it; that Mohammedanism is a mutilated offshoot of the Judæo-Christian tradition; that Hinduism breaks down on the issue of philosophic criticism, Buddhism on that of historical origins; and so on. In other words, it can show the unique interest and importance of the Catholic religion in the whole context of man's religious history. It can thus pose for us the central question: since no other religion can compare with Catholic Christianity as an incorporation of 'religion as such', can Catholic

Christianity accredit itself to us? But this is no part of the science of natural theology.

Mr Dawson's lectures are, in fact, largely taken up with a study, based on comparative religion, of the constituent elements of religious experience. Chief of these is man's sense of his own and the world's dependence on a 'transcendent element'—*quod omnes vocant Deum*. 'If the Hellenic idea of a visible intelligible divine order has disappeared', to give place to the cold impersonal mathematics of modern science, 'the argument of Job which appeals to the overwhelming reality of the mystery of transcendence has acquired new force. This is not an argument that satisfies man's natural desire for reassurance and security . . . Yet there can be no question of its religious power or of the fact that it appeals equally strongly to the most primitive and the most sophisticated minds.' And again, if man turns his gaze within, 'we have an immense body of testimony . . . from all the great traditions of the world religions which unite in asserting the presence of God in the depths of the soul as its eternal transcendent "ground"'. This discovery of God within us is made not by a leap of faith but by a contemplative intuition which presents us with 'a transcendent spiritual Being in and beyond the depths of the soul itself'. 'It is when . . . the transcendent power behind the world is related to the transcendent spirit beyond the soul, that the former realizes its full religious significance.' The classical instance is in Indian religion and philosophy, 'where the identification of Atman—the transcendent Self—with Brahma—the transcendent cosmic power—is formulated with exceptional clarity and . . . becomes the foundation of the whole religious and philosophical development of orthodox Hinduism'. Irreligious secularism is 'an extremely rare phenomenon in human thought'. At the most primitive level we often find the idea of an impersonal transcendent power (Mana, Orenda, etc.)—'a pagan analogy to the

Christian conception of grace'. And if Mana represents cosmic transcendence, the importance attached by primitive cultures to 'dream and vision, trance and ecstasy' bears witness to the internal intuition of transcendence—though the primitive man has 'no criterion to separate what is spiritually transcendent from what is naturally extraordinary'.

Despite this basic dependence on an experience of transcendence, in all the historic religions 'revelation is regarded as the primary source of religious truth, and intuition and reason are secondary'. Thus the historic religions do not regard themselves as deductions from the results of natural theology. The concept of revelation is found at every stage of religious development, whereas 'the idea of Natural Theology is found in only a few cultures and there only at a relatively advanced stage of development'. Yet the importance of natural theology is immense, since its rejection means that religion has no significance and value for the mind of man.

Mr Dawson's third chapter, studying the relation between religion and culture, covers ground familiar to students of his thought. Religion has a conservative, but also a dynamic, function: it can transform a culture, as we see for instance in the case of Islam. It is conditioned by the culture in which it finds itself; and on the other hand culture is never conceived as a purely man-made order; 'the social way of life is founded on a religious law of life'. The next chapters deal with 'the sources of religious knowledge and the religious organs of society', prophets, priests and kings: 'The Prophet is the organ of divine inspiration, the king is the organ of sacred powers, but the Priest is . . . the master of sacred science'. And Mr Dawson argues that science, philosophy and the development of the idea of law have their historical origin in religion. He next studies the ascetic influence of religion, and maintains that all the great ancient and mediæval cultures tended 'to regard the

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way of salvation and spiritual intuition as the ultimate goal of all human culture'. Finally, he passes judgment on modern secularism: 'The new scientific culture is devoid of all positive spiritual content . . . A culture of this kind is no culture at all in the traditional sense—that is to say it is not an order which integrates every side of human life in a living spiritual community, Indeed . . . the victory of technocracy may mean the destruction of humanity . . . The events of the last few years . . . have warned us in letters of fire that our civilization has been tried in the balance and found wanting . . . But there is no reason to believe that (secularism) will not ultimately be succeeded by a movement in the other direction towards religious belief and spiritual integration. . . . Religion is still a living force in the world today', but it has lost its organic relations with culture. 'We are faced with a spiritual conflict of the most acute kind, a sort of social schizophrenia . . . There must be a return to unity—a spiritual integration of culture—if mankind is to survive.'

This brief *résumé* may be enough to convince the reader that *Religion and Culture* is an important addition to that impressive *corpus* of works for which western culture and the Catholic Church are indebted to its distinguished author. If in one aspect it is a valuable companion volume to Otto Karrer's *Religions of Mankind* (though the special theological problem faced in the latter work was outside the scope of the Gifford Lectures), in other respects, and especially in its suggestion of a possible future turning of the tide towards religion, it may remind us of Bergson's great book, *The Two Sources of Religion and Morality*.

NICOLAUS OF AUTRECOURT'S REFUTATION OF ARISTOTELIANISM¹

By THE REVD FR LESLIE J. WALKER, S.J.

NICOLAUS of Autrecourt, a village near Verdun, was born at the opening of the fourteenth century, studied in Paris from 1320 to 1327, lectured there on the Sentences of Peter Lombard and on Aristotle from 1327 to 1340, became a Canon of Metz in 1338, and in 1340 was summoned to the Papal Court at Avignon to answer charges of unorthodoxy. The trial dragged on, and it was not until 1346 that several articles extracted from Nicolaus's letters were condemned by Cardinal Curty. In 1346 Nicolaus retracted, and his writings were publicly burnt. Two complete letters to Bernard of Arezzo survive, together with several fragments, an important letter to Egidius, an essay entitled *Utrum visio creaturae possit naturaliter intendi*, and a treatise entitled *Exigit ordo executionis*. The essay and the *Exigit* have been edited by J. Reginald O'Donnell and will be found in *Mediaeval Studies*, Vol. I (1939), pp. 179-280. The letters will be found in an article by J. Lappe entitled *Nicolaus von Autrecourt. Sein Leben, seine Philosophie, seine Schriften*, in the *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*. Bd. VI. Heft 2 Münster, 1908.

The philosophy of Nicolaus of Autrecourt is both critical and constructive. In his letters he seeks to show that certitude alike in physics and metaphysics is impossible; that the most we can hope for in any branch of philosophy is a theory which is more probable than any alternative theory. He then proceeds in the *Exigit* to construct a theory of the physical universe and of human knowledge which is, he claims, more probable

¹ *Nicolaus of Autrecourt*. A Study in Fourteenth Century Thought by Julius Rudolph Weinberg. Pp. ix + 242 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, for the University of Cincinnati, 1948; London : Geoffrey Cumberlege) 215.

than those devised by Aristotle and commonly accepted by the philosophers of his day. Mr Weinberg deals with the earlier and critical part of Nicolaus's philosophy in the first five chapters of his study; then in chapters VI to XIII examines and criticizes the highly complex theory which Nicolaus offered in lieu of that of Aristotle. He is undoubtedly right in maintaining that Nicolaus's aim was not to controvert, but to defend, the doctrines of the Church. It would also seem that Nicolaus was sincere in submitting himself to the Church, and again that the condemned propositions did not adequately represent his views. Weinberg's claim that Nicolaus did not merely seek to destroy belief in Aristotle, but also had a 'positive philosophic purpose in view' is also borne out by evidence.

'He felt that men were wasting their lives poring over the works of Aristotle and the Comments of Averroes instead of studying things and attempting to improve the faith and morals of the community. If it could be shown that the Aristotelian philosophy is neither a safe method of investigation of nature nor a dependable source of a theological elucidation and defence of the faith nor even a sound guide to morals, this would be of more than a little interest to philosophers, theologians, and moralists. It would have the effect of stimulating an entirely new direction in natural scientific investigations, it would render theology and philosophy less interdependent, and it would have a profound effect on moral theory.' (p. 99)

One of the difficulties keenly felt when the philosophy of Aristotle was revived in the thirteenth century was that of reconciling his theory of substance and accident with the doctrine of transubstantiation. Normally appearances imply and manifest substance, nor do characteristics, whether qualitative or quantitative, exist in nature apart from that which they characterize. But in the Eucharist the appearances of bread and wine do not

imply or manifest the substance of bread and wine, nor is it bread and wine that sustains them in being. Bread and wine are replaced by the Body and Blood of Christ, and their accidental characteristics are sustained in being by the action of God. But if in this case we cannot infer from given appearances a corresponding substance, argues Nicolaus, then in no case can we be sure of the existence of substance, for it is always possible that the appearances we ascribe to substance are in reality sustained by God. Neither, and for a like reason, given that miracles happen, can we with certainty infer from an observed occurrence the action of a natural cause.

That at the root of Nicolaus's scepticism in regard to the possibility of proving that substances exist and that causes are operative in nature lies his belief in transubstantiation and in miracles, and that in consequence his philosophy does not constitute an attack upon Christian faith but, on the contrary, is an attempt to defend it, is shown very clearly by Mr Weinberg in chapter v. But in making this careful and elaborate study of the philosophy of Nicolaus of Autrecourt he admits quite frankly that he has an axe to grind. In the 'blurb' to his work we are told that 'the author seeks to show that Nicolaus subjected to annihilating criticism the claims made for natural knowledge. The recent revival of Aristotelianism makes a study of this attack—occurring within the confines of Scholasticism and during the period itself—a particularly timely one.' The axe is not obtrusive in the course of the work—the philosophy of Nicolaus is for the most part allowed to speak for itself, but there can be no doubt about the hopes which the author has in submitting his study to the public, for in the opening paragraph of his Introduction he himself writes :

'We are often told that Truth never dies, and it is to be hoped that this is so. It is certain, however, that error is capable of repeated resurrection. Only thus can the recent attempt to revive Aristotelian

epistemology and metaphysics be described.¹ For the claims that Aristotelian philosophy made for natural knowledge were subjected to annihilating criticism in the fourteenth century by Nicolaus of Autrecourt and in the eighteenth century by David Hume. Apologists can make a specious case against Hume by urging that his climate of opinion and his temperament rendered him incapable of a correct understanding of Aristotle. It is impossible to make a similar case against Nicolaus of Autrecourt who, we may be sure, lived in a period of intellectual history that was steeped in Aristotelian conceptions and procedures. Hence, it is of importance for us to realize that a successful refutation of Aristotle occurred in the Scholastic period itself. For only in this way can we judge the rather extravagant claims currently urged in behalf of a return to Aristotelian modes of thought' (p. 3).

I too have been steeped in Aristotelian modes of thought ever since I began to study philosophy some fifty years ago, yet must confess that it would not have occurred to me that Nicolaus had *successfully* refuted Aristotle had not Mr Weinberg laid such stress on the point. The condemnation of a few propositions by Cardinal Curty suggests that the die-hards were somewhat perturbed, yet the perennial philosophy for which Aristotle is ultimately responsible was to survive not only the criticism of Nicolaus, but also that of Descartes, Hume and Kant. The question which Weinberg has raised must none the less be faced by those who still think as Aristotle did.

Attempts have been made to show that Nicolaus's reasoned scepticism was not so far-reaching as has sometimes been claimed. Thus Vignaux and Hochstetter hold that his criticism of the doctrine of faculties did not extend to the soul itself; Gilson in his *Philosophie au Moyen Age* maintains that Nicolaus did not deny that

¹ The author probably has in mind the revived interest which has manifested itself of late in the University of Chicago of which Robert M. Hutchins is Chancellor.

we have direct and certain knowledge of causal connexions; while Lappe and others allege that so far was Nicolaus from denying causal action of God that he makes him the sole cause of all that happens. Weinberg, having examined the relevant passages, has little difficulty in showing that all these views are mistaken. The argument against faculties applies equally to the existence of the soul (pp. 41-7). Nicolaus's reply to Egidius makes it perfectly clear that of efficient causality in his view we have but probable knowledge (pp. 47-9, and cp. 64-71). The possibility that God is the cause of all things is admitted, but only as a hypothesis (pp. 66-7). Nicolaus's position in regard to all transempirical realities is admirably and correctly summed up in the statement that 'a logically certified inference from an appearance to any reality not precisely included in it is out of the question' (p. 47).

On the other hand, arguments which are based upon and presuppose the existence of miracles, though possibly cogent when urged against those who, like Nicolaus, believe in miracles, will not cut much ice with those who regard miracles as myths. Hence, if the cogency of Nicolaus's arguments is to be admitted by philosophers in general, it must be shown that they do not presuppose miracles but are based simply upon logic and upon the analysis of sense-perception and thought. To show this is the main purpose of the earlier portion of Weinberg's study.

It was commonly held by Nicolaus's contemporaries that the intellect cannot err in apprehending an object immediately present to the senses provided this object be simple: it errs only when conjoining objects in positive judgments or in declining to admit their conjunction in the negative judgment. Nicolaus calls the object of simple apprehension an 'incomplex' object and the composite object formed in judgment a 'complex' object. Now a complex object may fall within experience,

as when I stand near a fire and feel myself get warm or apply fire to flax and watch it burn. Neither of the objects conjoined in such a case transcends experience, but if I assert that fire has warmed me or that fire causes flax to burn, I am conjoining with an object of experience an object which transcends experience, namely the causal action of fire, and in like manner when I assert that the observed properties of objects imply substantial form or that matter is implied by change of form. I must prove, therefore, the existence of cause, substance, and matter ; but this I cannot do, argues Nicolaus, for *ex eo quod una res est, non potest evidenter inferri quod alia res sit.*

This principle, which is basic to Nicolaus's criticism alike of cause, substance, and matter, is proved by an appeal to logic. If a conclusion is to be valid it must be identical, wholly or in part, with the premise with which we start. To introduce an alien factor, not comprised within that premise, is to invalidate it. Yet this is precisely what Aristotelians do when from observed phenomena they infer the existence of matter, substance and cause. If we *define* an accident to be a 'being in a subject', then from transmutation we can legitimately infer a subject; but, Nicolaus asserts, it is 'neither evident from itself nor from experience' that whiteness and other such observed appearances are accidents. The relevant passage, which is taken from the letter to Egidius is cited at length on page 57, and in the same letter by a similar argument Nicolaus seeks to dispose of causal actions :

'If you understand by natural agents "agents which being next to their patients and are not impeded posit the existence of their actions", I concede that it follows logically that: A natural agent is next to its patient and there is no impediment, therefore there is an action. But I say it is neither evident to anyone that there are such agents in the universe of things

not is it evident that such agents may be assumed to exist' (cited on p. 48).

All Nicolaus's arguments against the possibility of proving the existence of either matter, cause, or substance, are of this type, as Weinberg points out in chapter III (Cp. esp. p. 69 sq.). The existence of a cause or of a substratum can be proved only if one begs the question by introducing a premise or a definition which by implication asserts a causal connexion or a relation between accident and substance, and for such assertions no adequate evidence can be adduced. Ockham, for instance, sought to prove that coming-to-be and passing-away implies a material substratum by appeal to the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit* (see p. 55). To this argument Nicolaus replies in the *Exigit*:

'Remove the word *transmutation* but keep all the *appearances* and then see whether a subject may be inferred from them necessarily. The appearances are: the thing which did not previously exist exists now, or the thing which previously existed does not exist now. According to the opponents this is known, or, to speak more correctly, it is inferred. Now a subject could never be inferred from these propositions. If you say that the ancients agreed that *ex nihilo nihil fit*, I say "If by this proposition the ancients wished to denote the natural order which obtains among beings in that when one is generated another is corrupted so that nothing is generated unless something preceded to which that which becomes had a natural order in becoming, then their understanding would be true on this interpretation. But if they wished to understand something else by *ex nihilo nihil fit* it could be denied to them". ' (Cp. pp. 58-9.)

Commenting on this argument Weinberg says:

'We may be verbally committed to *saying* that the white *thing* becomes black or that the white *thing* becomes sweet. Again, we are tempted to interpret

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the constancy of certain forms (in a given region throughout change of other forms in that region) as the succession of forms in a substratum. But there is neither compulsion nor warrant in such an interpretation, and our commitments to certain verbal usages are matters of convention rather than logic. Nicolaus's point, then, is that the experimental *persuasion* that a substratum exists either begs the question in its very statement or is not in the least persuasive. If we accurately describe the appearances we do not find anything like a substratum involved in the description. Nicolaus's reply to his opponents, then, seems valid'. (pp. 60-1).

Weinberg is right in using the term 'persuasive' in this connexion. The argument used by Nicolaus's opponents did not purport to be a strictly logical proof of the existence of substrata and of causes. They are of the same type as those used by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* III, 4 *sq.*, in order to elucidate and make plain the law of contradiction. Their purport is to clarify the situation so that men may see that cause and substance and matter are involved in the very nature of coming-to-be. The dictum *ex nihilo nihil fit* meant much more to the Aristotelians than it did to Nicolaus. They saw in what comes to be something essentially relative, something that implies another being as its ground and yet another as the cause of its becoming. What comes to be is not something absolute, divorced from all other beings, but is essentially and intrinsically relative to other things the existence of which it implies. The relation of what comes to be to its cause is different from the relation of accident to substance, as Weinberg points out on p. 40, for agent and patient are admittedly two distinct things and both may be observed, whereas an 'accident' is but the actualization of what previously existed *in potentia* in the substance which it now perceptibly characterizes. Hence the relativity of coming-

to-be is two-fold: it involves and implies the potentiality of what comes to be and also the action of that which brings it into being. Moreover, if we think about coming-to-be it is possible to discern this two-fold relativity and so to recognize the existence of substance and of cause.

Weinberg admits that we are verbally committed to some such view, but ascribes it to mere convention. All that we perceive is that in a given region there is an appearance which was not there before and that such appearances occur one after the other. But the fact that we can prescind from substance and causal action does not prove their non-existence, nor does Weinberg attempt to explain how it comes about that conventionally men seem to recognize the existence of substance and cause. Nicolaus, on the other hand, in the passage on which Weinberg is commenting gives a reason for denying that becoming implies any transempirical reality. To Egidius he writes :

‘By the statement “this being is transmuted in substance” I understand only “this being exists and previously did not exist”. And I mean no other thing than non-being and being. If I meant something else I would understand a relation founded in being’ (cited on p. 58).

Hence it would seem that, though Nicolaus often appeals to the principle that ‘from the existence of one thing it is impossible to infer the existence of another thing’ and even seeks to prove this principle on the ground that a conclusion must not contain more than is comprised in the premise with which we start, he is well aware that if in the initial premise there is a relation between two existents his argument breaks down. But this, he claims, is to beg the question. In a sense this is true, but the Aristotelians claimed to have good ground for using premises asserting a relation between two things or between actual and potential being. ‘In necessary

propositions', says Weinberg, 'the subject involves the predicate or the predicate involves the subject, so that there is an identity between the signification of the terms' (p. 13). If 'to involve' means 'to comprise' this is true, but if 'to involve' means 'to imply' it does not follow that there is identity between the significance of the terms, and it was in this latter sense that a predicate was said to be 'involved' in a subject or a subject in a predicate in what were called *propositiones per se notae*. In some cases there is a partial identity, as in the proposition 'the whole is greater than the part', but there is no identity between subject and predicate in the proposition 'out of nothing nothing comes to be'; while in its positive counterpart 'becoming implies being' there is partial identity if the implied being be a material cause, but no identity if it be an efficient cause. Hence, if there be no way of proving that what comes to be implies a cause, neither is there any way of proving that what comes to be does not imply a cause. It is a question in both cases of what Nicolaus called *notitia evidens*: you either see the implication or you don't. So that in the end we are confronted with the *ipse dixit* of Nicolaus and Weinberg on the one hand, and with the *ipse dixit* of the Aristotelians on the other hand, but it is the *ipse dixit* of the Aristotelians that is borne out by conventional language, and also by the way in which men normally think. Hence in judging of the evidence adduced by both sides this should be borne in mind, for it may well be that the way in which we ordinarily speak is not due just to a bad habit.

Nicolaus's position in regard to Aristotle's four causes differs, moreover, in several respects from that of his latest disciple. For in the *Exigit* he admits the existence of final and efficient causes and also of substances, and for their existence offers a proof of his own devising. He does not, therefore, deny causes: he denies merely that the evidence adduced by his opponents is adequate

to justify conviction. And for this he gives a reason the validity of which Weinberg is not prepared to admit. His reason for denying that transmutation means anything more than the non-existence of an appearance followed by its existence is that, if it meant more than this, it would mean a '*relation founded in being.*' His opponents alleged that anyone who ponders the matter should be able to see that relativity to something else is inherent in and essential to everything that comes to be. Nicolaus denies the possibility of apprehending any such relation, because he does not believe that relations have any real existence: they are but concepts formed by the mind. This view of relations, says Weinberg, was adopted by Nicolaus 'in the interests of his dialectical experiments' and is 'completely untenable' (p. 153). Yet it is precisely because he has adopted this untenable view of relations that Nicolaus fails to see more in a sequence of events than a succession of appearances, for, had he admitted anything beyond this he would have been constrained to admit a relation founded in being.

There remains the argument from miracles. Here it seems to me that Nicolaus in his anxiety to allow for the possibility of miracles fails to distinguish between two questions, (1) the problem of determining what accounts for a particular instance of coming-to-be and (2) the question whether coming-to-be inevitably and in all cases implies something else which brings into being that which was not there before. Miracles are relevant only to the first question. Scotus sought to solve the problem of how to determine the cause of a particular type of event on the assumption that 'whatever occurs in a great many things from some cause which is not free is the natural effect of that cause'. To which Nicolaus replies that, even if it be allowed that 'something was produced in many cases, it is nevertheless not known that it ought to be thus produced in the

future'. Concerning things known by experience, e.g. "that the magnet attracts iron or that rhubarb cures cholera, we have only a conjectural habit, but not certitude' (p. 69). The Aristotelians claimed that we have certitude, provided we have ground for assuming that nature is running its natural course. If a healthy plant has been set in appropriate soil in an appropriate climate, we are certain that it will grow. If it doesn't, or if a well constructed machine fails to work, we do not say 'I made a bad guess'. We assume that the law of causality is still operative and look for some defect either in soil or climate or in the mechanism which we thought was in working order. Nicolaus objects that we can never know when the *suppositio communis cursus naturae* is justified, granted that miracles sometimes happen. His argument is given on p. 35, but is not easy to follow. Nicolaus states that 'a thing is not altered by the fact that its existence is caused by one agent rather than by another'. His opponents replied 'But the circumstances may be different'. To which Nicolaus answered that this does not alter the intrinsic nature of the cognition, so that it is still impossible to determine whether its cause is natural or supernatural. Nicolaus here seems to be confusing two cases. Every instance of coming-to-be implies a cause, but it is not possible from a given instance, considered in isolation from other events, to determine what the cause is. Certitude in the first case is metaphysical since it depends on the nature of coming-to-be. In the second case it is of a lower order and is justified only if nature is running its natural course, and to determine this point is possible provided circumstances be taken into account.

Mr Weinberg is convinced that Nicolaus has successfully refuted the Aristotelian position and that consequently it is a mistake to attempt to revive it. The opponents of Nicolaus maintained that the existence of cause is implied by the very nature of becoming. Weinberg

points out that it is possible to describe sequences of events without using words which imply causality; which is true, but irrelevant except in so far as it leaves unexplained the curious habit which mankind has somehow acquired. Nicolaus, aware that to prescind from causality does not disprove its existence, appeals to the dictum that from the existence of one thing the existence of another cannot be proved. The dictum can be proved only if transcendental relations are non-existent. Hence 'in the interest of his dialectical experiments' Nicolaus denies the existence of real relations, a view which even Mr. Weinberg finds quite untenable. It is Nicolaus, therefore, not his opponents, who proves his point by begging the question, for to most men the existence of relations is evident, as is also the existence of causes if we may judge by the language in which they choose to describe events.

The final argument which Nicolaus uses in order to discredit Aristotle consists in the construction of an alternative theory of the nature of things for which he claims a higher degree of probability. It is impossible in the space at my disposal to examine this theory in detail, but something must be said of its salient features. Nicolaus assumes as a first principle that this universe is good, and to be good means to be well ordered. This explains why one thing seems to exist for the sake of another. It also implies a final cause which is God, since to deny this is tantamount to denying the existence of goodness. This universe exists rather than any other because it is better ordered, which for Nicolaus implies that at all times it is equally perfect, for to become imperfect would imply a lapse from goodness. From which it follows, Nicolaus argues, that everything which exists always exists, and consequently that there is no such thing in reality as coming-to-be and passing-away. These principles are examined by Weinberg in chapter VII. If the universe is well ordered and things are related

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to one another as means to ends, the knowledge that they are thus related must either add to our knowledge of things or from the knowledge of things we must be able to infer their relations. But according to Nicolaus knowledge of relations adds nothing to the knowledge of things. Nor is the other alternative possible since he denies that from one thing the existence of any other can be inferred. Hence at the outset we are confronted with a contradiction. Nicolaus's theory of knowledge and his metaphysics are mutually incompatible, as Weinberg admits on p. 138.

In order to reconcile apparent change with the alleged eternity of all things, including perceptible qualities, Nicolaus distinguishes two kinds of eternal things, 'individuals of nature' such as essences and perceptible qualities, and 'individuals of place' such as atoms and points. Atoms and points are localized, but qualities can exist simultaneously in diverse places, and so, without ceasing to exist, can appear and disappear. This in Nicolaus's theory accounts for apparent changes of quality. Generation and corruption are accounted for on the hypothesis that atoms exist in a void and so may move closer together or further apart, may be congregated or segregated so as to form different things. Upon this theory Weinberg comments as follows:

'What changes then? The relative position of atoms has been altered. But this can take place *via* (and can be explained only in terms of) an alteration of relations. Relations, however, have no existential reality, so that it is impossible that what has no existence *a parte rei* can undergo alteration or generation. This would seem to mean that a differentiation of two states of the world would have no basis in physical fact and thus would be in every case an error' (p. 154).

So, too, Nicolaus's theory of the continuum, which denies infinite divisibility but admits the existence of points, shows, says Weinberg, 'an extraordinary degree

of confusion', for of his two arguments against infinite divisibility the first depends on his 'erroneous idea that relations are reducible to terms, and seems inconclusive', while the second is 'plainly invalid' (pp. 158-9).

In chapter xx Weinberg examines the arguments adduced by Nicolaus in support of his contention that motion, if taken as a real entity, is unintelligible. 'That which is composed of nonentities is not an entity', says Nicolaus; but motion comprises parts, one past and the other future. Hence to say that motion is 'a single successive being' is not really intelligible. This argument begs the question, Weinberg replies, 'because it assumes the unreality of relations', and his argument 'that we cannot assert true propositions about motion taken as successive being seems fallacious for another reason', for a complex symbol the 'parts of which are now equally present to the mind can refer to both past and present' (pp. 170-1).

The next two chapters are concerned with Nicolaus's theory of cognition in which Weinberg somewhat belatedly admits that there is a serious flaw. Nicolaus's reply to Egidius contains no answer to the arguments which the latter had adduced in support of his contention that the certitude of evidence has degrees (e.g. a premise is more obvious than its conclusion and colour more obvious to acute than to non-acute vision). Yet 'if these arguments are tenable they remove one of the most important foundations of Nicolaus's theory of evidence' (p. 194).

Another point of vital importance is discussed in the last chapter of Weinberg's learned study. Did Nicolaus in his later work revise his views on causal connexion? He defines cause in the *Exigit* to be 'whatever is necessary and *per se* requisite for the existence of an effect', and not only admits that there are causal connexions but formulates the laws which govern them. From this O'Donnell infers that in the *Exigit* Nicolaus admits the

possibility of our discerning causal connexions. Weinberg denies this, but concedes that in the *Exigit* Nicolaus 'appears to think that the experience of successful effort, of resistance to effort, and the like constitute *probabilities* for the existence of actual powers in things', whereas in the Bernard-Correspondence he 'holds that neither the actual nor the possible existence of causation is revealed to intuition' (p. 215). Yet implicit in these two positions there is already a contradiction, for how does Nicolaus obtain the notion of cause from the contemplation of successful effort and of resistance to effort except by intuition? Yet in the Bernard-Correspondence such an intuition of causation is explicitly denied, for we are there told that it is impossible to intuit causation even as a possibility. Nor is this contradiction surprising in view of the fact that, though Nicolaus attempts to solve the various difficulties to which his own account of the causation of cognition gives rise, his solutions seem even to Weinberg 'to be purely *ad hoc*, or inconsistent with his general position, or at any rate not articulated with the other details of his theory' (p. 222).

This being so, I fear that the aim which Mr Weinberg had in view when compiling this elaborate study of the philosophy of Nicolaus of Autrecourt will not be fulfilled. The efforts now being made to revive the Scholastic interpretation of Aristotle, however deplorable, will in no wise be perturbed because Nicolaus denies that it is possible to have an intuition of causation, nor yet by the arguments he uses. For one man's inability to see what another man claims to see does not justify him in denying that the other may be right; and for the blindness in Nicolaus's case it is possible to account: it was due to his erroneous ideas about relations. It is also possible that further reflexion brought about a partial recovery, for in effect Nicolaus would seem to have intuited causation, and in any case he admits that

a theory which affirms causation is more probable than a theory which denies it. Nor yet will the disciples of Aristotle be discouraged by that strange and ill-digested conglomeration of views, some borrowed from Plato, some from the Atomists, and yet others from Aristotle himself, which Nicolaus offers as an alternative to Aristotelianism. Aristotelianism is at least coherent and covers the whole field of human cognition, whereas the alternative which Nicolaus offers is fraught with inconsistencies and riddled with unwarranted assumptions and unsolved problems. No one in his senses could possibly think it more probable than the theory which Aristotle devised. Nicolaus, it seems to me, would have done better had he become a thorough-going Platonist and, instead of putting forward his Atomism as a probable account of what really is and really happens, have offered it in Platonist fashion merely as a way of 'saving phenomena', but so deep-rooted is his conviction that causes are operative in the natural order that he finds it quite impossible to discard them.

A NOTE ON KANT'S ETHICS

By PETER STUBBS

THE appearance of Prof. Paton's detailed and sympathetic exposition of the fundamental principles of Kant's moral philosophy¹ furnished an opportunity of looking once again at one or two of the salient characteristics of a system that may be rejected but cannot be ignored.

Kant's ethics would be generally characterized as according priority to the ideas of law and duty over those of 'natural end' and good. Yet two of the five formulations of the celebrated categorical imperative are couched in the language of 'ends': 'So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means'; 'So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends'.² Furthermore, the opening paragraph of *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* enunciates a thesis not of law and duty but of the nature of absolute good: 'Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification except a Good Will'.³ 'Kant is famous', Fr Jos. Rickaby once remarked, 'for a trick of replacing with his left hand what his right hand has taken away'. However, with a thinker of Kant's stature the effort to understand the reason for this rather disconcerting trick can hardly fail to be worth while.

To begin with, it is to be noted that he himself explicitly acknowledges 'the paradox of method' involved in his critique of practical reason, namely, that 'the concept of good and evil must not be determined

¹ *The Categorical Imperative: a study of Kant's Moral Philosophy* (Hutchinson's University Library, 1947) 21s.

² These translations are Prof. Paton's. Elsewhere the quotations are from T. K. Abbott's *Kant's Theory of Ethics* (hereafter referred to as Abb.).

³ Abb. p. 9.

before the moral law (of which it seems as if it must be the foundation), but only after it and by means of it'.¹ Why, we ask, did Kant adopt a position admittedly savouring of the paradoxical? The answer, it is suggested, is to be found in the dominating influence on Kant's ethical thinking of the desire to prove morality absolutely diaphanous to pure reason. And because of his 'Copernican revolution' in epistemology the desire could only be realized by a system of ethics embodying that very paradox. Kant was in fact scandalized by the methods of ethics formulated hitherto precisely because it seemed to him that in them the moral end is proposed *to* reason instead of *by* reason; the object enjoined on the will is not the autochthonous product of pure rationality. It is from this context of thought that the famous but notoriously inadequate supreme principle of morals, 'Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law',² derives its *raison d'être*. A criterion more transparently rational than that of universalization would indeed be difficult to conceive, but a more broken-backed attempt to elucidate the nature of moral goodness could hardly be imagined. The lack of any semblance of organic connexion between the matter or content of the act, a particular non-moral maxim proposed by inclination, and its 'moralizing' form, universality, is glaring. Similarly with the fundamental idea of the 'autonomy of the will' (which Kant expressly identifies with practical reason): it too has its *fons et origo* in the same context. 'Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition) . . . ' For 'if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy'.³

¹ Abb. p. 154.

² Abb. p. 38.

³ Abb. p. 59.

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However, the contention that 'it is only a formal law—that is, one which prescribes to reason nothing more than the form of its universal legislation as the supreme condition of its maxims—that can be *a priori* a determining principle of practical reason',¹ is sufficiently paradoxical to have greatly puzzled even its author. Kant frankly declares that, for him, 'to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other source, i.e. how the mere principle of the *universal validity of all its maxims as laws* . . . can of itself supply a spring without any matter (object of the will in which we could antecedently take any interest)'—to explain that is 'beyond the power of human reason'.² Kant can only fall back on the assertion that nevertheless it must *be* so, since 'the moral law is given as a fact of pure Reason of which we are *a priori* conscious and which is apodictically certain'.³ We, however, are free to contend that his mystification is largely self-induced, the product of a philosophy which inevitably leads its author to identify action in accordance with right reason with action in accordance with the bare form of law, apart from matter and end.

It is true, of course, that Kant not only formulates, but also often develops, his ethical principles in a manner that largely avoids—or is it only masks?—the element of paradox. This happens when he operates in terms not of an abstract principle of the universalizability of one's maxims, but of humanity as an end in itself in an ideal kingdom of ends. But the trouble with this line of development is the same as with the principle in which it is embodied, of which Rashdall observed in a very marked understatement that its relation to Kant's earlier one is 'not very precisely determined'. Further

¹ Abb. p. 155.

² Abb. p. 82.

³ Abb. p. 136.

inquiry into this ambiguous and always uneasy relationship will take us to the heart of the matter.

First, however, it should be noted that in the *Fundamental Principles*, immediately after making his crucial—and it must be said by no means logically transparent—transition from the idea of law to that of ‘end’, Kant declares that in ‘forming our moral judgments of action it is better to proceed always on the strict method, and start from the general formula of the categorical imperative: ‘Act according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law’.¹ He goes further; he suggests that the formula of ‘end’ is a concession to human weakness rather than, as some would like to have it, a more adequate or satisfactory expression of his ‘supreme principle of morals’. Its use is ‘to gain an entrance for the moral law’.² Any superiority it may possess is psychological. The ‘difference . . . is rather subjectively than objectively practical, intended namely to bring an idea of reason nearer to intuition (by means of a certain analogy), and thereby nearer to feeling’.³ And in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant significantly declares that ‘man is an end in himself . . . because he is the *subject* [psychological] of the moral law’.⁴

The crucial question, however, is whether Kant *could* consistently with the cardinal principle of his philosophy, formulate a system of ethics not characterized by the admitted ‘paradox of method’. I think not.

By virtue of his ‘Copernican revolution’ Kant deprives the mind of the power to apprehend the real (things-in-themselves). Knowledge of things becomes knowledge of the necessary forms of possible experience. Qualities or attributes of reality are replaced by necessary appearances. The objective is no longer correlated with the real but with a rule of the understanding. As the Master of Balliol puts it: ‘The principle of objectivity is within us’.⁵

¹ Abb. p. 55.

² Abb. *ibid.*

³ Abb. p. 54.

⁴ Abb. p. 229.

⁵ Kant, p. 179 (Leaders of Philosophy: Ernest Benn, Ltd.).

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In theoretical cognition the principle of objectivity is a function of the understanding, 'the faculty of rules', which rules or categories, investing sensuous intuitions, yield genuine knowledge of the reality of appearances. Practical knowledge, i.e. moral knowledge, on the other hand, is essentially differentiated from theoretical by not containing anything furnished by sense. Its object is in no way given to reason, 'the faculty of principles', as the object of theoretical cognition, in respect of its matter, is given to the understanding. Were practical reason (identified by Kant with the will) to receive anything from outside itself, morality would, on his view, be empirically conditioned by the faculty of sensitive desire ruled by the twin principles of pleasure and pain. Pure practical reason must, so to speak, 'excogitate' its object out of the principle or law by which alone it must be primarily determined, the law of the universality of its maxims. Practical reason 'must begin with the *possibility of practical principles a priori*'. 'Only after that', says Kant, 'can it proceed to *concepts* of the *objects* of a practical reason, namely, those of absolute good and evil, in order to assign them in accordance with those principles (for prior to those principles they cannot possibly be given as good and evil by any faculty of knowledge).'¹ They *can* be given—indeed must only be given if morality is not 'a vain and chimerical notion'—by practical *a priori* principles because such principles 'are at once cognitions' [i.e. have a determinate object], and 'have not to wait for intuitions in order to have significance', and 'that for this remarkable reason, because they themselves produce the reality to which they refer (the intention of the will), which is not the case with theoretical concepts'.²

These two quotations from the *Critique of Practical Reason* give us the pith of Kant's moral philosophy, and

¹ Abb. p. 183.

² Abb. p. 157.

would seem to reveal pretty clearly that 'the paradox of method' is indeed a 'critical' necessity; Kant's *System* of ethics is *not*, *pace* Prof. Paton, 'independent of his metaphysics' (p. 277). What *would* appear to be independent of his own metaphysics, but dependent upon a metaphysic still *residually* operative in his thought, crystallizes in the apostrophe beginning, 'Duty'! Thou sublime and mighty name . . . '1 in which the frigid contours of the *Critique of Practical Reason* are momentarily suffused with a glow of poetic fervour.

'Perhaps', wrote Gilson in his Gifford Lectures, 'Kant's ethics are but a Christian ethic cut loose from a Christian metaphysic that justifies it, the still imposing ruins of a temple with undermined foundations.'² 'Kant himself only conceived [duty and law] as rational because Christian philosophy had rationalized them.'³

¹ Abb. p. 180.

² *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 342.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 361. Cf. the remark on p. 359: 'Apart from Christian morals [Kantian moralism] would not exist'.

TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN AESTHETIC¹

By R. S. JENKINSON

WHATEVER view we may hold with regard to the nature of art, it cannot be denied that the production of works of art is a persistent human activity. As such, art demands the attention of anyone, and not least of the Christian and the Catholic, who wishes to arrive at a comprehensive view of the nature of man. And so the thinking Catholic must scrutinize the phenomenon of art, and assess its importance; he should try to achieve a Christian æsthetic—that is, he should determine the nature and confines of art and realize the full meaning that is inherent in art at its greatest. Moreover, at the present time of crisis for Christianity this process may be especially valuable.

Much is being written about æsthetics, and some of it from the Christian point of view, but sound and helpful though such writings sometimes are, there is perhaps a tendency to be obscure and to avoid certain problems that ought to be resolved. Therefore this article will attempt to be plain.

If we bear in mind the great variety of productions which may properly be called art, it is clear (as it seems to the writer) that all works of art do not deserve to be so called for one basic reason only—and philosophers should resist the temptation to find only one—but for at least two reasons, which may be found alone or in conjunction.

ART AS SATISFYING FORM

First, any production of the human spirit—a song, a dance, a poem, a statue, a building—may rightly be

¹[Debates on this topic are often unsatisfactory because the participants become entangled in particularities before discovering what principles are operating in one another's minds. Here Mr Jenkinson writes, by invitation, a comprehensive statement on the broadest lines, which will lead, it is hoped, to a fruitful discussion in the course of this year.]

termed a work of art, if it has imposed upon it or infused into it an original, man-made rhythm, form or harmony which is satisfying to the beholder. Let us admit at once that no two people would agree entirely upon a list of works which deserve to be placed in this category; also that what seems harmonious and satisfying to a Chinaman may not seem so to a Western European. But let us strongly assert, on the other hand, that a remarkable measure of agreement does exist over large areas of the world's surface, and over the passage of years, upon the artistic merit of certain works. It is this great corpus of art that we must principally examine. A certain degree of subjective preference and disagreement need in no way invalidate a general objective discussion.

To return to the definition just given, when we say that our satisfying form is man-made, we mean to contrast art with nature. Nature too has her formal loveliness, and the contemplation of nature may indeed satisfy the beholder—more deeply, it may be than art can satisfy him. A man who observes closely the structure of a flower may be led directly to the adoration of his Creator. We would invite no comparison between art and nature; we must merely stress that art, in so far as it is a man-made form, is altogether distinct from nature. We are concerned with productions of the human mind, with the array of Solomon rather than with the lilies of the field.

But art has, of course, an important relation to nature. Nature may well inspire the artist and provide him with his starting point. But merely to imitate nature is alike impossible and inartistic. In so far as a man with this purpose succeeds in his object, he is not only practising trickery and deceit, but is failing to be creative; and originality is essential in an artist. This does not mean that an original artist may not derive a great deal from nature—that he may not keep closely to natural appear-

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ances or forms or sounds—just as he may derive much help from other artists; but all must be moulded to his own purpose, his own original design. The Hermes of Praxiteles may be nearer to nature than the elongated Gothic figures of Chartres, but this fact is irrelevant when we are comparing the two from an æsthetic point of view.

Neither is this satisfying form in a work of art a matter of craftsmanship or technique. No amount of fine craftsmanship or technical excellence can of themselves produce a work of art, though they can be admirable servants of art. An artist is distinguished from a mere craftsman by his power to create, to select, to arrange. The danger is that, when an artist's creative power has run dry, he will seek to conceal the poverty of his imagination beneath an imposing technique. This is the story of later Italian painting. Much art is loved by so-called connoisseurs for its technique alone, just as many people love pictures because they reproduce faithfully the scenery of some region that they know. But such appreciation is not æsthetic. We may indeed be spellbound by the technical accomplishment of Vermeer, but it is because he could select and arrange and fill his pictures with a special atmosphere of his own that he is a great painter.

Certain productions, then, may properly be called works of art simply because they possess formal qualities, the contemplation of which the beholder finds to be a pleasing, satisfying, perhaps an invigorating experience. A Minoan vase, the architecture of Brunelleschi, perhaps the music of Mozart fall into this category.

ART AS COMMUNICATING A STATE OF AWARENESS

But in fact artistic forms are often quite evidently used as the vehicle of some 'message' which the artist wishes to communicate to his audience. Art, then, may properly be so called not only when it consists of satisfying form, but also when by it some experience

of the artist is adequately conveyed. So clearly is this the case that 'the communication of emotion' has often been given as the one essential *raison d'être* of art. This conclusion is objectionable for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph. However, though no message need be conveyed in a formally perfect work of art, yet it is clear that the communication of an experience from one person to another may also be an artistic process. The Tolstoyan boy who, in telling the story of his escape from the bear, infects his hearers with the emotion that he himself has felt, is producing his little work of art.

But 'emotion' is not a broad enough term. The experience may be at least as much intellectual as emotional, and an intellectual truth may be emotionally felt. We require a word which covers both emotion and intellect and goes deeper than either—a word which will include, if we wish, the grasp of deep truths with a peculiar intensity. Perhaps 'awareness' is the most suggestive word for the purpose.

An artist may communicate his particular awareness in a variety of ways—by words written or spoken, by music, by visual means. Some form there must be, if there is to be an adequate vehicle at all. In the case of purely formal art there need be, as we have seen, no message conveyed, but in the case of this artistic communication of a state of awareness there must be a certain formal element, though it may be very crude. And just as originality and spontaneity are essential in formal art, so sincerity is necessary if the artist is to move our hearts or deepen our understanding. It is not possible to give convincing expression to someone else's experience. That is why the imitators of Michelangelo, Leonardo and Raphael are so unconvincing. They did not feel what their masters felt, but they hoped to impose on us by copying their mannerisms. The states of awareness that artists wish to convey range from the trivial to the intense, from the blithe to the macabre, from comic

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to tragic, from the hell to the heaven of the soul. But each experience must be genuine, fresh, the particular vision of the artist in question, how he sees things, how he has felt them. It may be nature as Monet saw it, in terms of light, or Pope Innocent X as he appeared to Velasquez, the sensuous beauty of a Spanish night as it intoxicated de Falla, joy as it inspired Schiller and Beethoven, the nostalgia that pervades the novel of Proust.

ART CONTAINING BOTH FORM AND AWARENESS

A work of art, then, may be appreciated as such primarily because of the state of awareness of which it is the vehicle, or primarily—sometimes exclusively—for its formal qualities. No work of art can be denied the name, if it possesses either of these attributes. But a work will be more complete, if it both arises from a genuine state of awareness and is conveyed by a form which is in itself satisfying. In such cases we have a wholly admirable work of art—particularly if the technique is also adequate to the task. (Very little technique may be necessary. A simple folk-song may convey as telling a message as the elaborate orchestration of Elgar.) The exquisite satire of Jane Austen's perfectly constructed novels, the horror embedded in the taut forms of Picasso's *Guernica* pictures, the pure mysticism and fine painting of Fra Angelico—these are works of art admirable from both points of view.

It should not be forgotten that art is constantly appearing in daily life—that it has its humble reaches. A countryman, such as those in Hardy's novels, may communicate an experience altogether adequately, and may give his narration a striking form of its own by the employment of unusual, telling language. Even an 'artiste' singing in a public house may convey a real pathos, and give form and proportion of an original kind to her song.

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF WORKS OF ART

We have so far endeavoured to give a clear and concrete account of those productions of the human mind which deserve to be called works of art, to establish the nature of true art as opposed to false. The question now arises whether we can say that, among true works of art, some are 'greater' in any sense than others. Can we set a higher value upon some works of art than upon others? In point of fact, we certainly do this. The critics say that the 'Baignade' of Seurat is his masterpiece. In the case of this particular picture they probably mean that the formal qualities are more impressive here than in any of the painter's other works. Such phrases as 'the emotional elements in the design' are sometimes used, and it is true that there is on occasions a strangely moving quality in form itself, in the very shape and structure of works of art. This is particularly marked in the case of music and architecture. Many lovers of music seem to be entirely pre-occupied with this aspect of the art, and the very lines and shapes of the Parthenon may hold us awestruck, even when we are not conscious of the human aspiration which created it. In painting and sculpture and literature—especially as these arts are held today to be more akin to music than perhaps they really are—the same may apply.

It is accordingly true that one work of art may justifiably be considered to be a greater masterpiece than another in view of more impressive formal qualities. But there is a danger today that this way of looking at art shall be thought to be the beginning and end of the matter.

If it be recalled that the complete work of art is not only formally satisfying, but is the vehicle of a certain state of awareness, is it not reasonable to suppose that the deeper, the more sensitive the awareness of the artist, the greater will be his work of art? If so, works of art may be graded in some fashion according to the

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quality of the awareness of the artist. We feel that *Hamlet* is a great achievement because it is the product of a mind that is amazing in the scope and depth of its awareness. The same may be said of a symphony of Beethoven. A primitive epic such as the *Iliad* may survive through the centuries because it is the creation of a sensitive, if simple people. While any state of awareness adequately conveyed does result in a work of art, a more profound awareness produces a greater work of art.

GREAT ART IS AWARE OF THE THINGS THAT MATTER

But the greater works of art, we would maintain, are produced by artists who are not merely more sensitive than other people, but more sensitive to, more aware of, the things that matter. But what do we mean by 'the things that matter'? While no exact line may be drawn between the important and the unimportant, it may be said that what matters principally for an artist—as indeed for anyone else—is to be genuinely aware of the problems inherent in the conceptions 'man' and 'God', 'love' and 'life' and 'death'. If an artist has some sensitivity of his own with regard to these things, and by communicating it to us can deepen our understanding of them, he is truly a great artist. It may be well to stress again that artists who have nothing to tell us about the important things may none the less be perfectly valid artists, affording us delight and invigoration. But such, we would assert, are not the great artists of the world.

Let us take again Seurat's 'Baignade'. The form of it is very satisfying; the artist has also well conveyed his awareness of the shimmering heat, the heaviness, the almost bestial apathy of the figures. We are interested, we are impressed; but surely not roused to a deeper understanding of anything important. We turn to the National Gallery version of El Greco's 'Agony in the Garden'. There too is form at least as marvellous,

but there is an intense awareness of an agony, of a dramatic crisis—this much is clear to any sensitive observer; the Christian will also feel that El Greco has presented us with an adequate portrayal of a moment of the highest significance in the history of mankind. The theme of El Greco is greater than that of Seurat, and while a great theme will certainly not of necessity produce a great work of art—witness the acres of purely imitative and utterly uninspired religious paintings—a great theme, if greatly grasped, will of itself ennoble a work of art and transform it into an inspired masterpiece. Any work of art which handles sincerely and convincingly some aspect of the eternal problems inherent in the terms ‘man’ and ‘God,’ ‘love’ and ‘life’ and ‘death’ will enlarge our understanding and deepen our knowledge of the human predicament, which is as ennobling and purifying an experience as we may enjoy; it is the most valuable gift that art has to offer to any reflective person, and not least to the Christian and the Catholic.

We have so far given only one example of this highest kind of art—a specifically Christian example, and one concerned with the nature of man and of God. But our formula is not intended to be one which will satisfy Christians only. We have chosen the terms ‘man’ and ‘God,’ ‘love’ and ‘life’ and ‘death’ as covering what men have always felt to be the ultimately important mysteries. What is the nature of man, and what is his relation to the universe? In what kind of a God should he believe? Why is he so powerfully moved by love, and indeed by hatred? And what is the purpose and meaning of a man’s life, and why the pain and sorrow of death, and what hereafter? The greatest men are those who throw light upon these mysteries; the greatest artists are those who deepen our understanding of them.

It is not so much that an artist—as in the case of El Greco—is necessarily dealing with one of these

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subjects in any obvious way. Our judgment of a work of art must not be prejudiced too much by what seems at first glance to be its subject matter. It is rather that the great artist must be one who has some special awareness of the great mysteries; he will then link up, so to speak, every subject that he handles with this central attitude of his, and flood it with the light of his own particular vision. But the subject is also of importance. It is doubtful whether it is possible for Van Gogh's 'Chair'—or anyone's picture of a chair—to enlighten us as does Shakespeare's awareness of the utter disillusionment that may come upon an erring man.

'Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow

Creeps in this petty pace from day to day.'

Only when it is concerned with some aspect of the nature of man, of God, of love or life or death, is art—not only from the moral or religious point of view, but from the aesthetic—raised to sublimity. The use of the word 'æsthetic' in artistic theorizing has indeed had its dangers. A work of art must be judged by the total effect it has upon us, the elements of which are hardly separable.

Some illustrations may serve to clarify this conception of great art. We have noted how impressive the Parthenon is from the purely formal point of view and from its position just there upon the Acropolis, but how much too it tells us of the awareness on the part of its architects of an ideal perfection towards which civilized man should strive. And how is the experience of Chartres complete, if it does not include a deep awe at the way in which man can build for his God? Again, music—so apt to be admired for its form alone—is at its greatest when it records a deeply felt mood—of suffering, it may be, or the triumph over suffering, or when it induces into the heart of the listener a realization of the magnificent possibilities of life. More obviously in painting, in sculpture and in literature may a deep awareness be

induced of the things that matter. The way in which this happens may be straightforward enough (as in the pathos of a Border Ballad or in the stark tragedies of Æschylus), or the awareness may be conveyed, as in music, in a less explicable manner. A poem such as Blake's 'Hear the Voice of the Bard' may hold us in reverence alike of a profound experience and of the 'magical' words in which it is expounded—it may induce an awareness none the less important because it is not capable of exhaustive analysis. It is the business of art, after all, only to suggest, not to explain. Piero della Francesca is at once as formally impressive a painter as any in the history of art, and at the same time—owing to a certain unearthly majesty informing his figures that defies analysis—he conveys to us mysteriously yet unmistakably a sense of some awe-inspiring reality that lies beyond our ordinary world. Some degree of mystery in art is perfectly in place, provided that we feel a certainty of the artist's pre-occupation with the things that matter. To such mysterious art men at all times and in many places will respond; the artist's symbolism is sufficiently universal.

With this may be contrasted a less justifiable obscurity to be found in much contemporary art. There is perhaps too wide a use of private symbolisms, and even when these are understood, we may doubt whether the experience symbolized is of any great consequence. It would be hard to appreciate (except for its purely formal qualities) Paul Nash's 'Voyages of the Moon' without knowing that the artist was obsessed with 'the mind's voyage through space', and even when we are given the information, it is difficult to see the importance of this conception.

Great art, then, has something to tell us about man and God, love and life and death, and it conveys its message in form which is adequate and satisfying in itself. But it is not to be expected of great art that it should

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necessarily bring out the complete metaphysical truth of the situation with which it is concerned. It is more probable that the artist will feel intensely only one aspect of the matter; he may even be the victim of, or at least portray, some tragic human misconception. Conrad and Hardy, for instance, do not shirk the problem of evil—the powers of darkness that oppose mankind, powers that are indeed so real and so deadly that they can only be defeated, so to speak, at the very highest level. Such writers—and this is what we ask of a great artist—are vividly aware of the nature of man and the problems that confront him. Even Baudelaire was at grips with what matters, though he did not succeed in emerging from the slough of his despond.

It is misleading, too, if we look first for an approximation to some ideal of Beauty in a great work of art. Beauty is not on the whole a helpful term in æsthetics, unless it be defined as the form which clothes adequately a deep, but it may be far from pleasant, awareness. It is probable that Epstein, when he created his statue 'Genesis', was aware of something grim, earthbound and bestial in the process of generation, which the Book of Genesis might lead us to suppose is connected with the fall of man—its uglier aspect, in fact. Awareness of ugliness has its place in great art. Koestler's 'Darkness at Noon' is ugly enough; but the problem of the relationship between the individual and a totalitarian society is treated with so profound an understanding, and the whole clothed in such tragic grandeur, that to read the book is an ennobling and purifying experience.

CHRISTIAN ART POTENTIALLY THE GREATEST

What is required of great art is, first and foremost, that it should treat of some aspect of an eternally important problem with exceptionally deep understanding. However, provided that the intense awareness is there, the artist whose philosophy is in conformity with what

is actually true about the universe will produce a greater, a nobler work of art than the artist whose philosophy is warped and astray from the truth. This is surely only what we should expect. And, in the opinion of a Christian, the greatest work of art conceivable upon earth would undoubtedly be the work of one who was, more or less consciously, a Christian. And, in the eyes of a Catholic the greatest conceivable artist would be a Catholic. The Christian has the deepest insight into the human predicament, the most vivid awareness of the truth with regard to man and God, love and life and death, and the Catholic must claim that he alone has the grace required for the clearest vision of reality that is allowed to man on earth.

But, as it is, great art is no monopoly of Christians, still less of Catholics. If a Christian artist—and particularly a Catholic—was intensely aware of, and had a solution for all the problems inherent in the conceptions ‘man’ and ‘God,’ ‘love’ and ‘life’ and ‘death,’ if he could sympathize with the longings and temptations and defects, with all the joys and sorrows of mankind, as well as attaining to a close mystical union with his God, and if he commanded an adequate mastery of satisfying form, such an artist would give us the finest range of artistic creation that the world has ever seen. But we are asking a great deal. Perhaps Dante has approximated as nearly as any Catholic to this achievement; but his awareness is not intense at every point—he lacks, for example, Shakespeare’s breadth of human understanding; and he has his short comings as a Christian. Fra Angelico conveys a deep and genuine Catholic mysticism in a lovely and effective form, but he does not touch many important problems. It is often the case that a non-Christian has a more genuine awareness of some particular problem than a Christian whose general philosophy is nearer the truth. And all profound awareness is ennobling; there is no place for a narrow morality in art,

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any more than there is in true religion. An artist's sincere reaction is always valuable and illuminating—such as that of D. H. Lawrence, who was more 'religious' than many a professing Christian. Where, however, a Christian does possess a keen sensitivity, as well as a mastery of form, in any field, he will give us a nobler, a more profound work of art than the non-Christian. Mr. Graham Greene and M. François Mauriac are Catholic novelists at least on the way to this achievement.

This article has attempted to put forward a Christian æsthetic. Art, we conclude, has its delightful, shallower reaches, which are valuable and good for the joy and invigoration which they produce in us. But important art is that by which men convey to each other in moving, satisfying form their awareness of the things that matter. Ideally, the Catholic would best perform this task. But we may justifiably look upon any great work of art as among the wonders of creation. And as a Christian believes that God is the source of all that is pure and noble, he must also believe that all purifying and ennobling art—whether Christian or pagan—is in fact inspired by God, whether the artist acknowledges it or not, and that our reaction to this art brings with it a greater awareness of God; that any great work of art is in this sense transcendent; that it reflects in itself some small part of the perfection of God.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE STUDY OF HISTORY¹

By H. F. KEARNEY

IN the years before the First Great War, one of the most significant changes in the balance of university studies was the new value given to the study of history. The change was part of a wider movement to take history out of the hands of the amateur and the writer of belles-lettres, to make it more professional, more intellectual, more serious. Before the seventies, in England at least, history seems to have been regarded as a moral rather than an intellectual discipline. Charles Kingsley, Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, just before the establishment of the History Tripos, regularly used the rostrum as a pulpit. 'Tutors and fellows and lecturers came... and sat on the same benches as the undergraduates...: often as he told a story of heroism... loud and sudden cheers would break out spontaneously.' 'Men and women of history were the words that built up his sermon', which often resulted in the conversion of some of his listeners.² But from about that time the new outlook and technique, connected with names like Stubbs, Maitland and Round, became increasingly important until a few decades later Bury could claim that 'History is a science, no more and no less'.

That claim may be exaggerated, but no one can doubt that the approach of historians today is very different from what it was nearly a century ago. Among contemporary British philosophers, R. G. Collingwood was the first to attempt to estimate the significance of the new

¹ [It seems desirable to point out at once that the publication of this article does not imply a recommendation of all its conclusions, as the Editorial note at the end will make clear. We are indebted to Mr Kearney not only for this frank statement of difficulties which are felt by many Catholic historians and for raising important questions, but also for his willingness to allow a criticism of his answers to appear at the same time.]

² Quoted in *The Cambridge Historical Review* 1947.

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discipline. 'History occupies in the world of today', he wrote, 'a position analogous to that occupied by physics in the time of Locke: it is recognized as a special and autonomous form of thought lately established, whose possibilities have not yet been completely explored.' It might have been expected that high claims like this would have aroused some interest among Christians, for whom the study of history has always been so important. But Collingwood's work, even merely as a reflexion of the changed attitude towards history, seems to have been almost entirely ignored.

It may be, of course, that the doubtful value of Collingwood's metaphysics has damaged his reputation. But he was an excellent historian as well as a philosopher and his analysis of general historical method was based upon a lifetime of historical study. There is no reason why this analysis should be condemned with his metaphysics.

What he attempted to show was that, though apparently history is as old as Thucydides, it became something new at the end of the nineteenth century. In the first part of his book, 'The Idea of History', he discusses the changes in the meaning of the word 'history' from classical times to the present day, right up to Bury in fact. In the Middle Ages for example, a historical work was partly literary and partly 'rhetorical', a word which Collingwood uses 'to indicate the fact that most ancient and medieval historians aimed at proving a thesis, in particular some philosophical or political thesis'.

But the Middle Ages was not the only period to lack the true idea of history. Collingwood continues his criticism right up to modern times and he is very bitter at the expense of the so called 'scientific historians', fact grubbers on the German model. He points out that 'any large collection of facts, it was found, revealed patterns in plenty: and extrapolating such patterns into the remote past, about which there was little information and into the future about which there was none gave the

'scientific' historian just that sense of power which scissors-and-paste history denied him'.

The second half of 'The Idea of History' explains Collingwood's own idea of history. History has as its subject matter those acts which are the fruit of reflective thought. That is why politics, warfare, economic activity etc. are studied, since in those activities men are thinking with a purpose. Faced with historical evidence left by men who have been politicians etc., the historians try to discover the thought behind them. In a word, he must rethink it again for himself, exactly in the same way as M. Hercule Poirot uses his 'little grey cells' to find the truth. By such a process the historian establishes, if possible, a series of fixed points, from which he weaves a web of historical reconstruction with the aid of a *priori* imagination and never merely arbitrary fancy. By constant reference to the original data a trustworthy picture is built up. At least that is the theory. Collingwood is perfectly conscious that the aim of reconstructing the past and rethinking the thoughts of others can never be completely successful, but 'this separation between what is attempted in principle and what is achieved in practice is the lot of mankind, not a peculiarity of historical thinking'. We have merely to look at art, philosophy and the pursuit of virtue, to realize this.

This is merely a cursory glance at Collingwood's work, yet it suggests, that if a new form of thought has been born, or if, at least, a new approach has been made successfully to old problems, the historian who is a Christian must be prepared to answer several important questions. Christianity is a historical religion in a unique sense. Acceptance of its doctrines involves as a corollary the acceptance of a Christian view of history. It would seem, therefore, that the model for the Christian historian is not the scientist, who is able to keep his science and his religion in more or less watertight com-

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partments, but the Marxist historian, who knows that a pattern exists in history and accepts as his function its discovery in detail. For the Christian historian, the events of the Gospel and the life of the Church are part of the very stuff of history and to treat them in a different manner from other historical events would be to fall into a kind of Averroism. Hence apparently there should be a Christian interpretation of all history in the same way that there is a Marxist interpretation: Divine Providence should stand against Dialectical Materialism and the Christian historian should imitate his Marxist brethren in simplifying the complex pattern of history, in order that he may illustrate with concrete examples 'the known march of the providence of God'. If this is so, it would appear that a Christian cannot be a 'scientific' historian in the sense in which Collingwood uses the term; the acceptance of a Christian philosophy of history apparently affects the objectivity of the historian, as much as the acceptance of the Materialist interpretation. The first problem is, in fact, whether a Christian can be a good historian without forgetting that he is a Christian.

A second problem arises from the difference between the old and the new kind of history. It would seem that if a choice had to be made between Kingsley and Bury, the Christian should follow the example of the former. The Christian historian should never divorce history and morality: it should be part of his duty to pass judgment upon those men and movements who obviously belong to the *Civitas Terrena*. If some should think that this view is now outmoded, the powerful witness of Sir Richard Livingstone proves that they are mistaken. As recently as 1943 he quoted Lord Acton's call for historians 'to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty that history has the power to inflict on wrong' and then went on to say that 'unless we follow Acton's maxim, unless we judge, unless we clearly distinguish greatness from goodness, history has

as much power to corrupt as to instruct: it ceases to be an instrument of moral education'. Here again the historian who follows Acton goes against the new outlook. The choice would appear to be between being a Christian and being an historian, in the modern sense. These two allied problems—of objectivity and moral judgment—cannot be ignored.

The elements which go to make up the Christian philosophy of history are so obvious as to be truisms. The Christian believes that history had a beginning and will come to an end: that it can be divided into two periods, before and after the particular point in time when God became man. The history of the Jewish people before that event, the history of the Christian Church after it, are examples of the Providence of God. The doctrine of Providence is indeed the doctrine which most clearly differentiates the attitude of the Christian historian from that of his non-believing colleague. For him, History is not meaningless—it is a story, in which every man plays a part, however small. In a Christian universe, there can be no such thing as chance. As St. Augustine expresses it in one of the finest passages of the 'City of God': 'He, having left neither heaven nor earth nor angel nor man, no nor the most contemptible creature, neither the bird's feather nor the herb's flower nor the tree's leaf without the true harmony of their parts and peaceful concord of their composition, it is in no way credible that he would leave the kingdoms of men and their bondages loose and uncompromised in the laws of his eternal providence'.¹ That is the noblest statement of what must ever be the guiding principle of a Christian philosophy of history.

Apparently, therefore, the task of the Christian historian should be something other than that of the secular historian. The truth about the world is the whole story seen in its fullness; the truth about any particular event is not known completely until the part it plays in the

¹ Everyman Translation.

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whole story is also known. If the task of the historian is the discovery of historical truth, then an attempt to unravel at least part of the plan of Divine Providence would seem to be a necessary part of it. This is indeed the example that St Augustine sets: using the Christian revelation as a key, he attempts to decipher the historical details of the universal clash between the *Civitas Dei* and the *Civitas Terrena*.

Yet on reflexion such a task proves obviously impossible. In the first place, the mass of historical facts now available defeats any attempt to fit them into one hypothesis: St Augustine himself found difficulty in interpreting some historical events as examples of the workings of Divine Providence. Even with a developed technique and completely adequate sources, the task would be too much for the limited human mind. The historian must abandon any attempt to discover the whole truth in the Christian sense; it is impossible for him, *qua* historian, to justify the ways of God to men, or to unravel the mysterious workings of Divine Providence. He must be content to work on a lower plane, to discover the efficient not the final causes of historical events. His range therefore must be as limited as is that of the ordinary secular historian. Apart from the Old and New Testaments there are indeed a few instances where the 'why' can be glimpsed—the appearance and spread of Greek philosophy, the rise of the Roman Empire—but these are exceptions. The Christian no more than the secular historian can afford to waste his time in guess-work. He must be content to believe in Providence: to discover its workings can never be his part of his duty. Hence he cannot be compared with the Marxist historian whose task is much simpler, since there is one fundamental Marxist law of history in terms of which all events can be interpreted. The result is as much a caricature as that kind of Christian history in which the Church or its representatives are always given the benefit of any doubt.

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

Even on the lower plane of efficient causes, the Christian historian must be content with only part of the truth. Even if all the documents of an age survived, and the secret thoughts of all the participants in great events were known, the most important part of life—the life of grace—would still lie hidden. In this the historian's world resembles the top of an iceberg, four-fifths of which will always remain hidden below the surface. Though, therefore, he knows that the most important fact of all is the dependence of the world on God, the Christian historian must be content to write *as if* the universe was self-contained and *as if* the real man was that revealed by historical documents: *as if* there were such a thing as chance and there were no such things as miracles. This applies even in the writing of the lives of the Saints. It does not spring from disbelief but from a limitation of the scope of the historian. For example, the historian cannot ignore the fact of the stigmata of St Francis, but the exact interpretation of this fact, like the inner story of the saint's spiritual life, is something which is beyond his competence.

In short, to a Christian historian his religion is a life-line which enables him to avoid dropping into those pitfalls which beset his secular colleagues, who (like the natural scientist and the idealist philosopher in their own ways) are frequently tempted to identify the story which they have reconstructed with the 'real' world of history; although they know that the sources upon which it is constructed are those arbitrarily selected by time for survival. The Christian historian knows that the picture of the past which he tries to create has only a limited validity. Important clues to the problem are missing, and therefore the fact that the historian possesses a philosophy, or rather a theology, of history, cannot affect radically his tackling of historical problems. He is like a man in the unfortunate position of knowing the solution to a jigsaw puzzle of which half the pieces are

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missing and half persist in forming themselves into patterns which seem to contradict the whole. The solution given by his religion is essential in his whole life, but that part of himself which he brings to the study of history has no use for it. He must at all times avoid making what A. L. Smith called 'a peepshow of Providence'.

This might seem to be too hasty a retreat from positions which Christians could defend. In our own day one can point to men like Gilson and Dawson who have commented upon the history of philosophy and of civilization in the light of their religion. Their works apparently form a strong argument for the existence of a Christian historian proper. Here are works admitted by secular scholars to be of great value. Surely the mere existence of such books proves the existence of the Christian historian.

At this point we may well refer again to Collingwood's criticism of the mediæval habit of writing history to prove a thesis 'in particular, some philosophical or political or theological thesis'. It cannot be denied that Dawson and Gilson are very able historians, but in certain books, and those are the ones relevant to the present discussion, they did not write as historians. The difference between the historical attitude proper and what may be termed the sociological or philosophical approach to history may be illustrated by a comparison of Gilson's *Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale* with his *Unity of Philosophical Experience*. In writing the first Gilson used the evidence available to describe what various mediæval philosophers thought. The second book is much more ambitious: it is an attempt to write a history of philosophy showing its intrinsic intelligibility and the connexions along 'the endless chain of mutually destructive systems which run from Thales to Karl Marx'. The former is an historical work of the first order: the latter is a 'tour de force', perhaps greater in its own genre—but that

genre is not history. The first gives and explains facts without pressing them into service. The second uses facts to illustrate a brilliant thesis.

It is a common charge that one cannot trust Catholic historians because their works nearly always fall into this second category. In those cases where the charge is justified, for example in the later Belloc, it is because the historian has not been clear about the limitations of his subject. It is all too easy for a historian to trace patterns to his own liking, and if he is a Christian he may fall into the temptation under the impression that he is doing his duty by using the facts in the cause of his religion rather than that of the truth as he sees it. The mantle of Clio involves a heavy burden. The Christian may go further when he puts it off, but he ceases to be Clio's servant. The greatest of the historical virtues is humility.

From this can be deduced the answer to the question whether or not the historian who is also a Christian neglects his duty if he does not pass moral judgment. The answer surely must be that he should *not* set himself up as a judge. Quite apart from Christian charity, the world with which the historian is concerned is the limited one of 'history' with a small letter as opposed to 'History' as seen by God. He can never, therefore, be in a position to pass judgment on a person, the inner causes of whose acts he can never really know. We may make perhaps a distinction between the person and the acts itself to be condemned. But it is no part of the historian's task to be caught up in the controversies of moral theology. In any case he has not the equipment to discuss the difficult cases: where the solution is easy, his comment would be superfluous.

If history is an autonomous form of thought, then its end is the true not the good. It is an intellectual not a moral activity. There is, as we have seen, no more a Christian historian as such, than a Christian mathe-

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matician or a Christian biologist. The task of the historian is to achieve as much objective truth as is possible with the sources available. Moral reprobation is no part of it.

Finally, it might also be suggested that the very fact that an event has occurred makes moral judgment irrelevant. From one Christian point of view, the Reformation which split the unity of Christendom may seem to be an evil thing. But in some way it has worked for a greater good giving opportunities that did not exist before. Mankind cannot remain in the same state, and the inevitable change involves the destruction of some of the virtues of the old order. It goes without saying that the Church would remain essentially the same if her members were reduced to half a dozen outcasts living in a cave. Hence *for the historian* the question of whether a particular event was good or bad is improper. His task is to describe. Interpretation of the facts may be left to others—or to himself provided he realizes that he has forsaken his limited, but safe, role for something much more dangerous.

Three difficulties remain. In the first place, it might seem that discrimination between the various sources which he is using postulates a moral judgment on the part of the historian. For example, the historian of, say, early Franciscan history is compelled to use the chronicle of Salimbene with great care, apparently because he has judged that its author was a shallow, gossiping friar. But the difficulty is only apparent. The historian criticizes Salimbene's work, not Salimbene himself, and he criticizes it intellectually. His chronicle is bad historical material, but so are many pious Dominican works of the same period. Both kinds of writing are bad, because of the intellectual outlook of the authors or, it may be, of the limitations of time and place in which they were written.

The second difficulty is more serious. It is the problem of choosing subjects for historical research. There is

much research being done today which is merely the grubbing after useless fact: it can in fact be condemned as that vice of 'curiositas' which St Augustine and St Thomas condemn so roundly. But how, in fact, can useless learning be distinguished from liberal knowledge? History is a liberal discipline, studied for its own sake, though certain indirect advantages may accrue from it, and no crude criterion can be introduced into it. The choice of studying what he thinks to be important must be left with the individual himself. He alone can judge whether the work to which he is prepared to devote himself can be regarded as an important contribution to human knowledge. But it still remains an intellectual and not a moral decision.

A final difficulty allied with this concerns the place which Church history should occupy in the work of a historian who is a Christian. Since the Church is the visible representative of the 'Civitas Dei', it might seem that Church history is infinitely more important than secular history and that it should therefore appeal to the Christian historian as a subject for research. It would be so were it not for the fact that the inner life of the Church must escape the historian's microscope. The important themes of Church history must be treated in the same way as the great secular themes. ('Curiositas' is still a vice in ecclesiastical history.) The same historical impartiality and technique should be preserved: the temptation to give what appears to be the side of the Church the benefit of the doubt should be resisted. The Church can look after itself; the historian's concern is truth, not apologetics. Certain Catholic historians have gone too far in reaction against the Protestant interpretation of history which was in vogue during the nineteenth century, with the result that in many circles any history written by a Catholic is 'ipso facto' suspected of having an apologetic bias. These distortions of the truth were caused in good faith, but based upon a misapprehension

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of what in fact is the function of a Christian historian.

The truth is that the fact of being a Christian should be an advantage to a historian. He is not likely to fall into facile notions of progress or to twist the complex of history to support a particular thesis. He knows that history is not meaningless, but he also knows that his concern is with something abstracted from that larger story—true and valuable as far as it goes, but not going nearly to the end of the matter. Hence he can treat some particular subject for its own sake, without worrying about how it illustrates a particular interpretation. The Christian view of history is in fact the only sane one. If history is meaningless, there is no point in studying it. If it is full of meaning, the Christian attitude is the only one which leaves the historian scope for objectivity. The Marxist and all similar secular interpretations must distort the facts to fit a preconceived theory. The Christian, on the other hand, believes in History with a capital letter—the working of which he has caught glimpses; but he makes a study of history—on a lower plane—intimately linked, however, with the former. He is content with the small amount of historical truth that he can obtain—the whole story will escape him, in this world at least.

[A NOTE.—No reasonable person will object to Mr Kearney's warning that we should take care not to distort history like the Marxists in the interest of a preconceived theory. The other important questions which this article raises do not seem to be so firmly handled, and the following statement of opinion by another hand may be in place:

It is impossible to write 'general history' without making judgments of value; the very process of selection from the field of evidence involves them. And it would be deplorable if historians were to confine themselves to the mere editing of documents which refer to some relatively insignificant aspect of human activity. If it is

said that all aspects are equally significant for the historian, that the business of the historian as such is simply to amass as much evidence as possible on as many subjects as possible, the reply is that history, like all special disciplines, does not attain its own true stature unless it is informed by intelligence. The historian who is ignorant of man's ultimate destiny approaches his task with a defective intelligence; he is incapable of understanding the material with which he is working. It does not follow that the Christian historian is committed to an impossible investigation of the workings of Providence or to the passing of judgment on men's consciences. But he will be better qualified than the agnostic (other things being equal) to pass prudential judgments about cause and effect, without which no historical narrative can be composed, and he need not scruple to refer on occasion not only to the corruption of the clergy but also to the rapacity of princes. It is the business of the historian and especially of the Catholic historian, so far as his circumstances permit him, to preserve the dignity of history as one of the liberal arts and to prevent it from degenerating into an arid and inhumane technique. What should be meant by an educated Catholic is a man who views all human functions not as in watertight compartments but as co-ordinated to a single end, illuminated by an indivisible truth (an 'intellectual' element must not be shut off from a 'moral'). And that is what is meant by saying that an educated Catholic must be a theologian (and so a philosopher). The academic history of our time is in the main not 'objective' history but agnostic history, and we should not ape it. It is true that the historian who writes for an agnostic public will be well advised to state no controversial beliefs except in so far as he has already shown grounds for entertaining them by means of his historical enquiry. Let him by all means stick to the facts. But let him not gloss over the most important of them in deference to academic prejudice.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE STUDY OF HISTORY

Two points seem to call for particular comment.

(1) Gilson's *Unity of Philosophical Experience* is criticized for 'using' facts 'to illustrate a brilliant thesis'. This may mean that Gilson has not given adequate grounds for the conclusions which he reaches or that he has twisted facts to serve his purposes (in either case it would be interesting to know the grounds for Mr Kearney's conclusion). But the general context suggests that Mr Kearney is disapproving in principle of any attempt to trace patterns in history. Would he deny to Mr Dawson's Gifford Lectures (reviewed on another page) the name of history?

(2) Mr Kearney's separation of history from metaphysics seems to have served him ill in his references to Collingwood. Collingwood's claim that the true nature of history has been only recently discovered was based on his own highly peculiar philosophical views (in particular, the view to which he seems to have arrived, more or less definitely, in later life that all thinking is historical thinking, a Hegelian theory which leads logically to an absolute scepticism). For the apparent contradictions in Collingwood's treatment of the subject it must suffice to refer a discussion of *The Idea of History* by Mr W. H. Walsh in *Philosophy* for July 1947 (pp. 153 f); but it seems necessary to suggest that they may be responsible to some extent for a certain incoherence (as the present writer sees it) in Mr Kearney's account of the subject matter of history, and in particular for the curious doctrine of 'whatever is, is right' which appears towards the end of his essay. Historians who make use of Collingwood's work should be on their guard against unconsciously assimilating an attitude of mind which presupposes controversial answers to philosophical questions.]

LAST GLIMPSES OF GLASTONBURY

By DOM AELRED WATKIN

OF the three documents given below, the two last are printed for the first time, while the first has appeared only in a not too satisfactory paraphrase. This latter document, which gives us a sight of Glastonbury in 1534, needs little explanation. It is an agreement entered into by Abbot Richard Whiting and James Renynger of Glastonbury who, in exchange for a salary of £10 a year, a 'lyvery gowne' and a suitable dwelling, shall undertake the duties of organist and instructor of the song-school at Glastonbury. His duties are given in some detail. He is to sing and play the organ at the services in the Lady Chapel and in the high choir of Glastonbury, he is 'to serve the . . . [Abbot] . . . with songis and playing yn instruments of musyke as yn the tymes of Cristesmas and other sesons', and he is to teach children chosen by the Abbot to play the organ, the Abbot providing 'clavyngcordes' for the purpose. The endorsement on the back of the document shows that Renynger was still receiving his £10 a year in 1569.

P.R.O. Exchequer K.R. Ecclesiastical Documents
2/31.

Indenture dated 10th August 26 Henry VIII [1534] between Richard Whityng, abbot of Glastonbury, and James Renynger of Glastonbury, singing man.

This indenture made the tenth day of Auguste the xxvith yere of the reigne of our soveraigne lorde Kyng Henry the viiith betwyne the right Reverend Fader in Gode Richard Whityng Abbott of the monastery of our blessid Lady of Glastyngberry and the covent of the same yn the countye of Somersett of the oon partie

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And James Renynger of Glastyngberry foreseid yn the seide countye syngyng man of the other partie Witnesith that the seide James Renynger hath covenautid and grauntid and aggreid and by thies presentes covenautith grauntith and aggreith to serve the seyde reverend fader and covent and their successours yn the monastery of Glastyngberry foreseide yn his facultie of syngyng and playng upon the organes terme of his lyfe as yn deyly services of our Lady kepyng yn the chappell of our blessid Lady yn Glastyngberry foreseid as deyly matens masses yevensonges complens anteymes and all other devyne services as hath ben accostamably usid to be songen yn the seid chapell of our blessid Lady of Glastyngberry byfore the tyme of thies covenantes and to do service yn syngyng and playng upon the organs yn the high quier of Glastyngberry foreseid yn all the almaner suche festes and festyval deydes as hath ben yn leke tymes passid usid and accostomyd ther And yn leke wise to serve the seid Reverend Fader and his successours with songis and playng yn instrumentes of musyke as yn the tymes of Cristesmas and other sesons as hath ben heretofore usid and accostomed and at any other tyme or tymes when the seide James Renynger schalbe therunto requyred by the seide reverend Fader his successours or assignes And farther the seide James Renynger covenautith grauntith and aggreith to instructe and teche sixe chyldren always at the pleasur of the seide Reverend fader or his successours for the chappell of our blessid Lady in Glastyngberry sufficiently lafully and melodyously with all his dyligence in pricke songe and descaunte of the whiche sixe chyldren two of theym yerly to be sufficyently instructid and taughte by the seide James Renynger yn playng at the organes by the space of two yers the seide two chyldren to be always chosen at the pleasure of the seid Reverend fader and his successours whiche he or they shall thynke to be most apte therto so that the frendes of the two seide chyldren wolbe bounde yn

suffycyent bondes that the seide two shyldren and every of theym schall serve the seide Reverend fader and his successours yn syngyng and pleyng at the organes deyly yn the seid chappell of our Lady and high quier of the monastery of Glastyngberry aforeseide and other tymes of the yere yn maner and forme as ys afore rehersed by the space os sixe yers nexte ensuyng the seide two yers of theyre techyng yn syngyng and pleyng And the seid Reverend fader and his successours schall fynde the seide James Renynger clavyngcordes to teche the seid two chyldren to pley upon for the whiche service well and trewly so to be don the seid Reverend fader and covent covenautith and grauntith to the seide James Renynger duryng his lyfe as well yn sykenes as yn helthe ten poundes of lafull money of England aswell for his stypendy as for his mete and drynke at fower princypall termes of the yer by equall porcyons at the right reverend fader is cheker of receyte yn Glastyngberry to be taken and receyvid and also oons yn every yere his livery gowne or elles thritteyn shillynges and fouer pens yn money for the seide gowne always at the pleasure and eleccyon of the seid reverend fader and his successours Also two lodes of wodde brought home to the seide James Renynger his house or chambour and his howse rent free or els xiii s. iiii d. by the yer for it Provydid always that yf it happen the seid James Renynger to be taken up by vertewe of any of the Kynges commysyons or by any other by his auctoryte to serve his grace that yf the same James Renynger cum to Glastyngberry agayne withyn oon yere and oon dey then next folloyng and so from thens forthe do his dylygent service yn syngyng and playng at organes and techyng of chyldren at altymes and yn every thyng accordyngly yn maner ans forme as is afore rehersed that then he to have his perpetuyte agayne without any interruption or lett And also yf it happen the seid James Renynger not to do his dylygence yn techyng and instructyng of the seid sixe chyldren as yn syngyng and

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playing as is byfore rehersed to the pleasure of the seide Reverend fader or his successours or elles yf it happen the seid James to be seke or aged so that he cannott well and dylygently instructe and teche the seide chyldren that then it shalbe lawfull to the deid reverend fader and his successours to abate of the seide ten poundes for the techyng and instructyng of the seide syxe chyldren yerly cliii s.iiii d. In witnes wherof to the oon parte of thies present indenturis remaynyng with the seid James Renynger the aforeseid Reverend fader Richard Whityng Abbott of the foreseid monastery of Glastyngberry and covent of the same have putt their covent seale And to the other parte remayng with the forseid reverend fader and covent the forseid James Renynger hath putt his seale Yeven at Glastyngberry forseid the dey and yere aboveseide.

Tag for seal. The seal, apparently that of the Abbey, is entirely missing.

Endorsed: Allow this Annuitie of x li. with tharrerages for three years ending at Michelmas anno xmo Regine Elizabeth.

Winchester Wa: Mildmay.

The second document is a series of depositions made at Wells in April 1544. Though the full set of questions of which we have here the answers is missing, their general purport is clear. Robert Burgess the husband of Abbot Whiting's niece had, just before the dissolution of Glastonbury, embarked on ambitious building operations at Mells. It is evident that Abbot Whiting had, or was alleged to have had, promised Burgess that he would defray the expenses of the repairs and structural alterations which the latter had carried out; but, with the abbey dissolved, the money was not now forthcoming, Burgess therefore sent in a claim to the King for the payment of the debt he owed in consequence. The depositions here printed are the result of enquiries

made at the order of the King to test the truth of Burgess's allegations. Among those summoned to answer questions are Sir Thomas Way, a monk of Glastonbury who had acted as Abbot's Chaplain, Thomas Whyting of Pilton, probably a nephew of the Abbot, and various carpenters and stonemasons from Leigh-on-Mendip, Mells, Nunney and Cranmore who had been employed by Burgess in his work of reconstruction. It is interesting to know that Abbot Whiting was at Mells 'a litle before his deth', as Thomas Whyting euphemistically terms it.

P.R.O. Exchq. K.R. Misc. Documents 2/32 (A.D. 1544).

Depositions taken att Welles the xxiiij day of Aprile in the xxxvj yer of the reign of our sovereign Henry by the grace of God of England Fraunse and Ireland kyng defendour of the faith and on erth suppreme hedde of the churches of England and Ireland before Nicholas Fitzjames Esquier and John Mawdelyn gentleman by vertue of the kinges commission herunto annexed to them directed.

Sir Thomas Way preeste of thage of lxviij yeres sumtyme monke of the late monasterie of Glastonbur' sworne and examined as to the first interrogatorie he saieth he knoweth not of any consideracion that shold cause the said late abbatte to deliver unto the said Roberte Burges one C li. in money nor he doth know of the delyvere of the said C li. but he saieth that the said Roberte Burges dyd marie a nece of the said late abbates. Item to the seconde and thridd article he can not depose but he saieth that he himself dyd wayte uppon the said late abbatte as his chaplain when the said late abbatte was at the howse of the said Roberte Burges at Melles and ther he herd the said abbatte say thes wordes: 'Roberte Burges I know your tenemente and howse was greatly decaied therfor what ye bestow on it hit shalbe

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alowed'. And diverse tymes he herd the said abbatte say afterwarde that the charges and costes layed out by Burges in building and reparacions of his tenemente and milles longing to the same shold be alowed so that he shold be no loser but what was don or bestowed in the building and repairing the same he knoweth not. Item to the iiijth vth articles he cannot depose. Item to the vjth article he saieth as before that he herd the said abbatte say that it shold be alowed that the said Roberte dyd bestow on the said reparacions. Item to the vijth article he sayeth he hath don greate reparacions and buildinges but to what valew he doth not know. Item to the viijth ixth articles he can not depose. And to the xth he was with the said late abbate at the said howse to view the same.

Thomas Whyting of Pylton of thage of lxiiij yeres sworn and examined saieth to the first article that the said Roberte Burges dyd marie the nece of the said late abbatte but he dyd geve nothing with her nor promised to geve to the knowlege of this deponent. Item to the ijd and iijd articles he saieth that about iij yeres after the said mariage the said Roberte Burges dyd take of the said late abbatte a tenemente in Mellys with ij milles videlicet a fullyng with ij stokkes and a grieste mill which at that tyme were in greate decaye and delivered him C li. and willed him to repaire the sed tenemente with the said milles and the water workes of the same sufficiently and bestowed thereon about CCC merkes. Item to the iiijth vth and vjth articles he can not depose. Item to the vijth he knoweth not that the said abbatte delivered unto the said Roberte att any tyme plate or money besides the said C li or any platte or platter wherby he shold builde the said tenemente but that he shold builde it substantiall according to his occupacion as he herd. Item to the viijth article he saieth that he herd the said abbatte say to this deponent that Burges shold loke upon the tenemente and milles and sufficiently

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repare and amende them and he wold see to his paynes that he shold be no loser therby. Item to the ixth article he can not depose. Item to the xth article he saieth that the said late abbate was at Mellys a litle before his deth and dyd see the reparacions ther done by the said Roberte.

John Gent of Lygh in the com' of Somers' mason of thage of xl yeres sworn and examined to the first ijd iiijd iiijth vth vjth and vijth articles he can not depose. Item to the viijth article he saieth that he dyd worke uppon the said tenemente and milles and the weres belonging to the said milles and that ther was bestowed on the reparacions of the ij milles and other water-workes above lx li and this deponent made a botrey in the tenement which cost the said Roberte Burges above vij li.

Thomas Harrys of Mellys carpenter of the age of l yeres sworne and examined saieth that the said tenemente and milles were in greate decay and that one Wathell a carpenter made new the tokyng mille and had vij li. for his labour of the said Burges and this deponent made the grestmill and dyd receive of Roberte Burges x li. for the same work and that one Wyllyam Palmer mason did receive of the said Roberte Burges for the howse and tokyngmille and for the reparacion of stone work vj li. xiiij s. iiijd. and for making of iiij feldes of a howse vj li. and for making a mantell in a kechen xl s. and mor he knoweth not.

Roger Bradok of Noney carpenter of thage of lxx yeres sworn and examined saieth that he and one John Stourton of Noney aforsaid then his man dyd receive of Roberte Burges of Mellys aforsaid for makyng of xiiij feldes of tymbre worke in his tenemente at Mellys and for other tymbrework about the said tenemente aboute foure score poundes in money. And mor he can not depose.

John Clyves of Cranmer in the com' or Somers' of thage of lx yeres and Water Clyves of Redlyng of thage of xl yeres both sworn and examined saien uppon ther

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othes that they both be masons and they both dyd new make the stone work of the hall and parlour of the tenemente of the said Robert Burges in Mellys and they received for the same work of the said Roberte Burges xiiij li and odde money. And mor they know not.

Also on behalf of the said Robert Burges wer shewed unto us certen writinges in a paper of costes don in reparacions and building of the tenemente of the said Roberte which billes be hereunto filed and annexed.

(Signed) Nicholas FitzJames John Ma(wde)le(yn).

Endorsements: (i) Domino nostro regi in curia sua generalium supervisorum terrarum et tenementorum dicti domini regis certificatio. (2) Ex parte Burges deposiciones. (3) Commission for Robert Burgess debt. (4) Decretum inde fit.

The third document is a translation of the Latin Manuscript Autobiography of Fr William Weston, s.j., preserved at Stonyhurst. The translation is written in an early nineteenth century hand and is preserved in the Downside archives.

The main outlines of the story do not raise any queries. The only point which does require elucidation is the whereabouts of this hill which was said by local tradition in Fr Weston's time to be the place where Joseph of Arimathea had first landed, alleged to be one mile from a spot three or four miles from Glastonbury and to have 'confused ruins' at the top. This place cannot be Glastonbury Tor, for that fulfills neither of the first two conditions, and Wirral or Weary-all Hill would fit the second only. It appears clear that there must be an error somewhere. We have, however, one clue. Fr William Good the Jesuit, who died in Rome in 1586 and had been familiar with Glastonbury in his youth, says that many of the monks held that the body of St Joseph was buried at Montacute—or Hamdon Hill nearby. Fr Edward Maihew

also speaks of an aged Catholic who used to ascend the pointed hill at Montacute—which like Glastonbury Tor had a chapel to St Michael upon it—on his knees, and this about the time of which Fr Weston is speaking. At Montacute then we have a hill and chapel associated with Joseph of Arimathea, the ruins of which doubtless remained till the building of the present tower there in the eighteenth century, and we have the story of an old man ascending the hill on his knees. We have, then, to conclude, I think, that Fr Weston had got his distances muddled and that his host lived further away from Glastonbury than three or four miles.¹ Perhaps the most interesting part of the story is the old man's belief that at the top of the hill was some path or passage to Purgatory and his allegations that he had heard there the wailings of spirits. This superstition takes us right back to early Celtic times; it is the origin of St Patrick's Purgatory, and it is doubtless connected with the legend of the king of the underworld who was supposed in earliest times to have his abode on Glastonbury Tor. At Montacute we have a sharp pointed hill—*mons acutus*—like Glastonbury Tor and which, like the Tor, was surmounted by a chapel in honour of St Michael. In the sixteenth century at least, the Glastonbury tradition was that St Joseph of Arimathea may have been buried there. In fact the whole connexion between Glastonbury and the hill of Montacute needs investigation; and it is not unlikely that here, with its steep conical hill so reminiscent of that of Avalon, there may too have been in early times, as at Glastonbury, a tradition of a passage to the underworld. In any case, whether the story refers to Glastonbury or to Montacute,

¹ Thomas Gerard in his *Description of Somerset* (1633) [ed. Bates, Som. Rec. Soc., p. 98]: 'that in this chappell [on Montacute Hill] was founde one of those nayles which fastened Our Saviour to the crosse, which a gentleman (Mr H.) not farr of kept sometime and after sold for a greate sune of money to be transported beyond the seas'. Gerard adds 'This place by some latter zealous Recusants hath bin had in greate veneration, for they believe that.....the body of Joseph of Aremathea.....was here interred.'

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this persistence of such an ancient belief up to the end of the sixteenth century is remarkable and significant.

Translation of a passage in Fr Weston's Autobiography; Downside Archives A 16.

'About the year 1586, a little before I was taken into custody, in the course of my visits I came, as a guest, to the house of a certain Catholic, a very old man, eighty years of age (as indeed I think) and entirely grey. This man, before the oppression and destruction of the monastery by Henry VIII, had served as a servant or the deputy of some office in the monastery of Glastonbury; at the overthrow of which building, when all the most sacred and secret things of religion, being laid open to the profane, were handled by sacrilegious hands, amongst other things which he was able to snatch or save, as if from a fire, was a certain Cross, sacred and religious, not so much on account of the material (though it was of gold and studded with precious stones) as on account of some venerable relics of saints inserted therein. But the principal thing was one of the nails with which the body of Our Saviour Jesus Christ was nailed to the Cross. This, brought over to England by St Joseph of Arimathea and his companions (as common opinion and report says, handed down from hand to hand as a perpetual and successive inheritance) at length obtained a fixed place in the monastery of Glastonbury, to which place also it is said that the body of the same St Joseph was, after some centuries, translated and most religiously preserved. Now this old man, with great veneration as was just, preserved the nail for many years. After some time this circumstance became known to Jewel, the pseudo-bishop of Salisbury, who, having obtained authority from the Prince, by an act of the greatest injustice, violently took away the nail; but to what purposes he afterwards applied it, or where he put it, is unknown. I was not able to see the nail but the old man showed

me the case made of wood, in which it had been enclosed and which, on account of the softness of the material, even yet represented and retained the impressed form of the nail. It was, as well as I could conjecture, one foot long and the thickness of a finger in the upper part: the head was not indeed broad, but the lower part was somewhat broader than the other part of it, rising gradually to a point, divided by four or five corners. The old man also related a wonderful miracle, performed a little time before by the agency of this case of the nail, or by the cross which I have mentioned (by which I do not clearly remember, but I think it was by the case of the nail), and confirmed by the testimony of almost all of the inhabitants of the place: viz: that a large and deep wound of a certain boy, was, by its sole touch, suddenly cured.

The house of this man is distant about three or four English miles from the ancient monastery and about one mile from the place where report says that St Joseph with his companions fixed the seat of his abode. This place is situated on a high mountain; and its ancient foundations and confused ruins are still extant to be seen. To this place he told me that he was accustomed sometimes to ascend, out of a motive of religion and devotion, not on his feet, but on his knees, carrying with him the cross and the case of the nail, "as my safeguard," he said, "against the attacks of spirits, for I have heard there wailings and groans and the mournful voices of people in grief", so that he thought it was some entrance and passage to the pains of Purgatory.

He had also, as the continuation of a ceremonious duty of religion, a lamp always burning in that part of the house which looked towards the hill. All these and many other wonderful things did this old man recount to me; so that I remained there two days or more, captivated and charmed beyond my expectation at his discourses.'

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

The Teaching of the Catholic Church: A Summary of Catholic Doctrine arranged and edited by Canon George Smith, D.D., PH.D. Pp. xiv + 1316 (Burns Oates and Washbourne) 50s.

WE are still very badly in need of theology in English: the layman is being continually urged to bring his study of religion up to the level of his acquaintance with the secular sciences, the priest needs to look back over his theology and reflect again on the main theses in the light of newer developments—perhaps at a time when he is less sure of his Latin than he used to be. The test of this new two-volume edition of the *Treasury of the Faith* series must therefore be, how far does it go to meet that need?

Undoubtedly it is a very useful and even a rather full summary of doctrine. With the scheme as a whole before him and guided by Canon Smith's outline, the reader will be able to appreciate the grandeur and unity of dogmatic theology much better than from the separately published essays. The authors were originally chosen as experts in their subjects and they did succeed on the whole in presenting these in a manner calculated to attract the layman without insulting his intelligence. The new volumes are handsome in appearance, with good print and binding, and the price is not unreasonable in view of the difficulties of book production at the present time. But is this enough? Would it not have been possible to produce something far more creditable to Catholic scholarship in this field, revised in the light of more recent trends in theology and adapted to a wider need?

The publishers seem to think that this adaptation has been made: 'The series has been newly edited, completely revised and in parts re-written', claims the blurb. Yet the editor admits, 'They appear now almost exactly as they were first printed'. There are in fact two entirely new essays, there are some abridgements, useful cross-references and an index: that appears to be all.

Even for the home-market and for that object of the publisher's special predilection, the 'educated layman', this is not good enough. Since these essays were first published, the Catholic layman—without having had much better opportunities of studying theology systematically—has been reading a great deal of theology at a more advanced stage than what is contained in these volumes, he has been provided with books on philosophy to a far greater extent than in the first quarter of this century and he has learnt to acquire

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a scientific outlook which could not have been anticipated by the members of this team when they first made their contributions. He will not therefore be satisfied with what may be a correct but is certainly a too hasty dismissal of Whitehead in a footnote: 'Modern scientific philosophy has discarded Darwinism in favour of a God evolving with the universe in which he works creatively. But to require development in God is sheer anthropomorphism' (p. 97). De Lubac's approach to the problem of natural desire might have been made known in this country too late for consideration even in a revised edition, but Dr O'Mahoney provided us with ample material for further reflexion on man's destiny in 1929 and the best work of Christopher Dawson on not unrelated problems has appeared precisely during these twenty years. Nor does it seem as if the authors at the time of writing wished to exclude all the more controversial views: Fr de la Taille's theory of the Mass, described as an opinion 'of recent years', is given special attention; but our intelligent layman has now read de la Taille in English and has been thinking for five years about Masure's contribution to the debate. In the essay on our Lady the treatment of the Assumption is much too vague and provides no reason to satisfy the inquirer about his support of the petition for the definition of this dogma.

Such limitations as these are all the more obvious when one turns to a new contribution, Dom Aelred Graham's 'The Church on Earth'. Other essays are quite as well-written, but this at least takes account of the encyclical *Mystici Corporis* and thus has to devote a third of the space to the subject already treated—at a much earlier date—in the essay which precedes it. Instead of this sort of uneasy juxtaposition, could not those authors who are still living—and who have in fact shown themselves to be well aware of the latest developments—have been asked to re-write their essays in the light of their further reflexions? And we are not so poor in scholarship that theologians could not have been found to replace those who have died since the series was first published.

A bibliography is indispensable in a work of this nature and need not have placed an impossible burden on the editor. Each of these eminent authors could have provided a rapid survey of the work accomplished in his own field and thus have helped, not only the educated layman, but all of us who are interested in the further unfolding of the riches of Catholic teaching, to appreciate the various contributions at something like their true value.

EDWARD QUINN.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Christian Marriage by George H. Joyce, S.J. 2nd edition. Pp. xiii + 645 (Sheed and Ward) 21s.

Questions Théologique sur le Mariage by E. Boissard. Pp. 136 (Les Editions du Cerf) 160 frs.

THE late Father Joyce's historical and doctrinal study on *Christian Marriage* was widely praised on its first appearance in 1933, and it was very soon translated into German. It was carefully revised by the author himself, with a view to a second edition, and this revision had been completed when he died in 1943. It is doubtless in consequence of the general disruption of the war years that this second edition has only just been published. It has been seen through the press by Fr Courtney, S.J., who has revised the Index. The Editor points out that most of the alterations affect only a few lines, but in some cases entire pages have been re-written, and this applies to the historical section in chapter II. The chapter on the Church's jurisdiction over matrimonial causes has also been revised, and there is a new section on papal dispensations viewed historically. There are also one or two additions to the documents in the Appendix, but these are not of very special importance. The work indeed remains, as we should expect it to be, more or less as it was in its first edition, so far as its general conception is concerned. If it ever should be revised again, I would suggest that some space should be found for an exposition of the views of Bucer on matrimony, side by side with those of Luther and Melanchthon. These are of particular interest, inasmuch as they may well have had some influence upon the rather lax matrimonial views entertained by the Reforming party in this country in the reign of Edward VI.

A more original work has recently appeared in French from the pen of Edmond Boissard, a monk of Solesmes. It consists of a discussion of twenty questions, mainly with the educated laity in view. The author displays a manifest anxiety to utilize some of the new theological contributions made to the subject in recent years, though he is rightly on his guard in the case of those of Dr Doms. Even so, I do not think that his treatment of the Thomist conception of marriage is at all adequate. And I am inclined to think that he attaches far too much importance to the rubric in the Nuptial Mass which lays it down that the priest should urge the newly weds to 'remain chaste during feasts and fasts'. In fact the author's ideas on this whole matter are summed up in his discussion of the twentieth question, in which he concludes that, while sanctity is *possible* in the married state, it is decidedly *difficult*.

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I would not go so far as to accuse Dom Edmond of that 'sexual pessimism' so rightly deplored by Père Nicolas, O.P., but I must confess that I profoundly dislike the attempt to see in the practice of Christian Marriage an obstacle to true sanctity. I have, in any case, made my own views on this subject abundantly clear elsewhere. Even so, on the principle that we must be thankful for small mercies, I am glad that Dom Edmond has advanced some steps in what I conceive to be the right direction.

E. C. MESSENGER.

The New Testament Doctrine of Baptism by W. F. Flemington, M.A. Pp. 160 (S.P.C.K.) 10s. 6d.

THE Tutor in New Testament Language and Literature at Wesley House, Cambridge has written a wise and telling study from Scriptural sources of the origin, practice and meaning of Baptism in the early Christian Church. It starts with the antecedents of Christian baptism. Jewish proselyte baptism existed in the first century and did not carry for the Jewish mind, the author holds, that distinction between a ceremonial and a moral act with which we are familiar, for the whole man was conceived as affected; it was therefore a quasi-sacramental precedent and analogue of Christian baptism. But primarily it was a ceremonial purification. So the moral element, the hitherto latent meaning of the 'tebilah' rite, was brought out by St John the Baptist. Last of the Hebrew prophets, he exemplified their principle of mimetic action. His baptism was neither mimetic magic nor mere symbolism, but a rite realistically understood by those who submitted to it as embodying their repentance and its acceptance.

To this rite Jesus himself submitted, making himself one with the sinful people of Isaian prophecy. His baptism, always regarded as of great importance by Apostolic Christianity, was marked off from the baptism of John by the manifestation of Sonship (Mr Flemington says the increased consciousness of Sonship) and of the Spirit. When later our Lord said 'I have a baptism wherewith to be baptized; and how am I straightened till it be accomplished' (Luke XII, 50) he may well have been referring not directly to his Passion as a plunging in the waters of sorrow, but to the sense that baptism had possessed for religious minds since the days of John: 'A spiritual purification . . . a renewal of the whole nature preparatory to the entrance into the Kingdom of God'. Accordingly he himself here provides the link between his death and baptism which is developed by St Paul. As his baptism by John had inaugu-

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ated the Public Ministry, so his death and resurrection, called a 'baptism', inaugurated the post-Crucifixion extension of the Kingdom.

After examining the evidence of Acts, Mr Flemington concludes that it shows no real contrast between baptism in the Spirit and water-baptism. Except for cases which are scrupulously noted as exceptional, the ordinary reception into the Church was by water-baptism. Mr Flemington accepts the authenticity of St Peter's Pentecostal sermon (Acts II, 28). 'Preaching' and 'hearing' are constantly mentioned in connexion with baptism because it was 'a concrete embodiment of the apostolic preaching. It connoted remission of sins, membership of the new community, the endowment of the Holy Spirit; all those blessings of the New Age the offer of which had been made in the preaching of the Word. For a man to submit to baptism was the recognized way of giving expression to the fact that he had "heard" or "received the word"—that he "believed".' Yet the significance of the rite was not supplied subjectively by the convert. It was already there, for baptism was a 'sacrament of "realized eschatology" that outwardly embodied the meaning and essence of the Gospel'. But why should water-baptism have remained when the Baptist's words seemed to suggest its abolishment? Although unable to accept the authenticity of Matt. xxviii, 19, Mr Flemington concludes from the universality of the practice of baptism in the New Testament and from the wealth of meaning discoverable in its significance combined with an underlying unity of teaching, that it came from the authority of Jesus himself.

The best sections in the book are those on baptism in the Pauline epistles. The principal passages are given a very fine exegesis. The ideas of faith, justification, unity, sonship and the giving of the Spirit recur in connexion with baptism (and we would add, the Three Divine Persons). St Paul does not stress 'repentance' as did the Baptist and St Peter in Acts because his converts had their baptism behind them already. Being baptized into Christ is 'a re-enacting for the believer of what once happened to our Lord'. Behind every Christian baptism was the death of Jesus, and conversely, when St Paul is giving his profoundest teaching on Christ's death, baptism is always at the back of his mind. The Epistle to the Romans emphasizes the effect of baptism on the individual. Ephesians hymns its effect on that Church which Christ loved and for which he gave himself 'that he might sanctify it, by the washing of water and the word . . . a glorious Church, not having spot

or wrinkle' (Eph. v, 25-7). Here, against the background of the sacrificial thought of the Old Testament, Christ is Priest and Victim, 'consecrating' the Church. Individuals are 'baptized into Christ's death because behind every Christian baptism is the love and self-offering of Jesus', but in the passage from Ephesians (here Dr Vincent Taylor is being quoted) 'The personal element is not forgotten; on the contrary it is greatly enriched, because it is seen within the life of a corporate fellowship . . . *Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus* is the law of sanctification as well as of reconciliation'.

Mr Flemington has wise things to say on 'realized eschatology'. True and valuable as is the recognition that the Kingdom of God has already come, that the inexhaustible wealth of Christ is mediated by baptism to the believer as a present possession, the Kingdom is also 'proleptic', anticipatory. 'Our citizenship is in heaven from which we also wait for a Saviour' (Phil. III, 20). Therefore the baptized are 'sealed unto a day of redemption' (Eph. IV, 30), and the gift of the Holy Spirit is a 'first instalment of the inheritance' (I, 13, 14). Mr Flemington gives short shrift to the notions that the doctrine of baptism originated with St Paul and that it derived from the Mystery Religions. At the same time he gently chides Protestant exegetes for their fear to acknowledge that for St Paul baptism was a sacrament acting 'ex opere operato'. He himself touches this subject with caution, not perhaps fully realizing—though he mentions it—that for Catholic doctrine the clause 'non ponentibus obicem' is always understood, and that in adults this means a positive disposition of the will. He expresses Catholic doctrine when he says: 'For St Paul baptism was far more than a dramatic means of preaching the Gospel. In baptism itself something happened. The symbolism was not only expressive but also effective.' As he rightly observes, this takes nothing from the importance of faith, of adhesion to the Gospel. For St Paul's converts, no distinction would appear.

Space forbids reference to other useful points made in considering the Johannine and other New Testament evidence. But we should like to note the chapter on the Baptism of Infants, and compare it with a chapter of a forthcoming book, *Le baptême des enfants et la doctrine biblique du baptême*, which the distinguished Protestant theologian Oscar Cullmann has just published in *Dieu Vivant* (11, pp. 45-66). Both rightly (we think) agree that there is no direct New Testament evidence for the practice, but mention that the children of proselytes converted to Judaism were 'baptized' with their parents. The fact that they could make no promises

was not regarded as a hindrance on the ground that action on behalf of another was permissible so long as it was obviously for his good. Those born after the reception of such parents were not 'baptized'. M. Cullmann, citing I Cor. vii, 14, is inclined to hold that in the same way the children of convert Christians were baptized with their parents but those born afterwards were not. Mr Flemington points out that the children born later to Jewish converts would have been circumcized, and, as Christians regarded baptism as giving the entry to the New Covenant which circumcision did to the Old, it would be natural for them to have their children baptized. M. Cullmann argues very well that if one starts from the theological concept of baptism as aggregation to the Christian community, one sees that pædo-baptism is fully in accord with New Testament doctrine. He further thinks that there is indication of the practice in the recording by all the Synoptics of our Lord's blessing the children, where the words $\mu\eta\ \kappa\omega\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\tau\epsilon\tau\epsilon$, 'forbid them not', are technical. On his part Mr Flemington notes that St Paul tells children how to behave 'in the Lord' (Eph. vi, 1; Col. iii, 20), an expression which denotes membership of the Body of Christ, entered by baptism. If we combine the arguments of these two scholars, we have powerful indirect evidence, even apart from very early tradition, that the baptism of the 'households' mentioned in the New Testament would have included children.

While warmly appreciating this book we must regret that we noticed no quotation from a Catholic scholar, except Baron von Hügel (in a footnote). A similar work of modern Catholic scholarship would have included many references to Protestant writers. It is to be hoped that Protestant theology will not remain so closed and provincial. The reason is probably a prejudice that orthodoxy and sincere Biblical scholarship cannot co-exist. Then there is a critical prejudice. As long as 'Q' hangs like a mist before one's eyes, it is hard to take seriously the views of those who reject it. And then there is the fear of committing oneself in a Catholic sense. But Mr Flemington's uncertainties are always honest. We conclude by speaking of his view that Matt. xxviii, 19 cannot be authentic, although there must have been a command from our Lord to baptize. The text is in all MSS and versions. In the light of this, the 'difficulties' raised by Conybeare from Eusebius were never real, and, as Mr Flemington shows, they were disposed of by Chase. However, he bows to the historical argument that the constant mention in Acts of baptism 'in the name of Jesus' shows that there was no Trinitarian formula. But 'in the name' expressed

by ἐν or ἐπὶ the authority by which baptism was performed, or by εἰς the mystical identification which resulted (cf. I Cor. i, 13 'into the name of Paul' and x, 2 'into Moses'), but not necessarily a liturgical formula. On the other hand the Trinitarian context of many Pauline references to baptism, and the reference to the Holy Spirit in Acts xix, 3, suggest the presence of just such a Trinitarian formula as we find in Matt. xxviii, 19. Finally we should expect that at this place our Lord would summarize the Trinitarian implications of the whole Gospel story.

DOM RALPH RUSSELL.

The Priest and the Proletariat by Robert Kother. Translated by Frank Mather. Pp. 64 (Sheed and Ward) 2s. 6d.

TUNC vere monachi sunt, si labore manuum suarum vivunt, sicut et patres nostri, et apostoli.' St Benedict's words show that the experiments recorded in this significant little book are not revolutionary in the Church. It was by prayer and work, chiefly manual, that Benedictines built up a new Christendom. Until the fourth century it had been a pretty general practice that clerics, too, should support themselves by their work, and the 'Statuta Ecclesiæ Antiquæ' order it. It is for the Church to alter her discipline, and when the needs of the age require a clergy devoted entirely to their clerical life, she can recall the injunction of the Apostle that 'those who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel'. But she never forgets that her Divine Founder was a Carpenter.

Recent Popes have been calling upon priests to find new methods of apostolate to the modern world. They have said that the greatest scandal of the nineteenth century was the loss of working men to the Church, and that the task of the twentieth is to bring them back. As the Church went forward from the crumbling structure of Roman society to win the new nations for Christ, so the command has come again: *Duc in altum*. For Catholicism is not bound up with Capitalist Society. The new society, in almost complete ignorance of Christianity, is evolving its own culture, capable of Christianization.

The chief centre of experiments which seek to go to the root of the problem and re-Christianize the new proletarian culture is France. Already a considerable literature has sprung from this experience, and it is summarized in this book. There was the experience of priests called up to the army, of priests among the refugees, of priests and seminarians in concentration and forced Labour

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Camps (much use is made of Father Perrin's recently translated book *Priest Workman in Germany*), and of those priests who, with the permission of their superiors, have voluntarily chosen a 'working class career', like Father Loew among the dockers of Marseilles, and the priests of the *Mission de Paris* and the *Mission de France*. The French clergy had become separated from their people in a way which we do not think is true of England or (as Father Perrin remarks) of Germany. Their re-discovery of working men is perhaps all the fresher. By sharing their sufferings and their labour, they came to understand the meaning of their life, the dignity of their work, the secret of the natural community and the need for natural leaders. 'We must come forth', they said, 'from our Catholic ghettos', and they determined that what they had to create was 'Christian communities in all the natural communities', so that the parish became everywhere 'the Christian expression of a natural community already in existence' (p. 21). These 'natural communities' have occupied the attention of sociologists like Professor Mannheim in England. 'I know now what "the honour of being a worker" means' wrote Père Dillard, quoted by the Abbé Kothen on p. 27. 'If I were a worker, my body would have to be fashioned and sculptured for the purpose . . . Had I lived this since I was a boy, my degree of sensibility would be quite different . . . If the mind is conditioned by the senses, it is not at all surprising that there should be a "working-class mentality" . . . that will always be alien to philosophers and scholars . . . It was not by mere chance that Christ chose to be a worker . . . In our day he would perhaps have loved steel as he loved wood.' In each group they found a natural leader: the factory delegate, the social worker and so on, and set to work to discover these leaders in the natural spheres of life.

In Paris Cardinal Suhard has given leave to some of his priests to live, for a time, the lives of working-men. They do not conceal their priesthood. 'Our vocation,' says one of them (p. 33) 'is to live the life of the masses and become part of them . . . Nothing separates us from our flock: not dress, nor speech nor mode of life. Most of the priests of my mission work in factories; one of them keeps a cobbler's shop'. After the Liberation, the militant Communists said to this priest-cobbler who had fought with them: 'You ought to say Mass for the ones who got killed—and say it here, right on the barricades'. He did, and that was the start of an apostolate which knew no 'methods' except friendship, the example and presence of the priest, and the profound needs of

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the human soul which he represents. His flock crowd round him as he works and chat. He says Mass in the room next to his shop. 'In this Christian community not all are Christians. The title of Christian has to be won. Baptism is given as though it were a consecration. It is a public ceremony such as took place in the early days of the Church. On that day the faithful go to the parish church. The priest puts on his priestly dress over his workman's jacket . . . and receives the catechumen in front of the church, surrounded by members of the community.'

The priests of the *Mission de France* are trained at the seminary at Lisieux, each seminarist spending a year in a factory during his studies. The needs of the country districts are being specially studied, and the fact that many priests are sons of peasants is of great value. Similarly the professional groups of Catholic Action use priests who have had previous experience in the professions.

This is a point which we should like to stress. The very excellence of a movement to help the 'worker' carries within itself the danger of neglect of others. Students also have their work for the Mystical Body, and as they are set aside in the community to study, study is their vocation, not a rather feeble running after manual work. At the same time their studies should never be selfish, but related to the needs of the community; the same applies to professional men. Working men's groups in Catholic Action are the first to recognize the services which student and professional groups can render them. Indeed they are urgently necessary. Success or failure in converting or influencing the 'intellectuals' will alter the whole future life of the country. The attraction of a priestly life among working men should therefore not blind us to the need for more priests to give themselves to the task of forming and training other groups.

In all these matters the Hierarchy decides. The duties of a priest might easily be forgotten in hasty enthusiasm, and only those judged suitable may lay aside their ordinary clerical life. The French Hierarchy has made its mind clear in a series of regulations. The bishops 'see with approval all that is noble and generous in the aspirations of many priests towards a living apostolate adapted to the needs of the de-Christianized masses. They see also the longing of these priests for a parish life centred round the liturgy, but a liturgy put within reach of, and made intelligible to, the Christian people' (p. 56). The Bishops themselves organized the *Mission de France* and the *Mission de Paris*. But there must be no ill-timed enterprises, and the first condition for fruitful work is 'an obedient

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and trustful attitude towards the Hierarchy'. In exceptional cases they will permit priests to work in factories, but they give a warning against certain illusions: 'It would be a mistake to wish to identify the apostolate of the clergy with that of the laity, or to use it as a substitute . . . Priests should respect this vocation of the laity; they themselves have a different vocation . . . What the laity asks of priests is that they should be, fully and entirely, priests'. 'It is from very strong and lofty motives that the Church obliges her clergy to wear an ecclesiastical dress . . . Our priests love their *soutanes*, because they are a constant reminder of the life of sacrifice and total surrender to which they have voluntarily pledged themselves . . . This general rule does not exclude exceptional cases . . . But in these cases, the Bishop remains the sole judge' (pp. 59-60).

One may doubt if the time has come for priests to work in factories in this country, but other discoveries of our French brethren may recommend themselves to practical pastors of souls who, knowing well their own flocks and their activities, feel their responsibility for those vast, paganized masses who are evolving their own culture far from the practice of any religion. There may be training to be given at the seminary stage, natural communities to be looked for in a great parish, a linking of their work with the liturgy, and, with permission, the bringing of the Mass to the places where the actual work is done. This book mentions workmen presenting the fruit of their labour to the Holy Father and Mass in a gas works in Rome. In a particular area some Catholic 'militants' by going to live for some months among people below subsistence level might discover that only the presence of a priest there could re-Christianize their lives. The Abbé Michonneau, with his team of priests in their 'Paroisse Missionnaire', work both to build up the faithful and to take the Church to the pagans, introduced by Catholic laymen. All such missionary work depends on the careful formation of militant members of Catholic Action in all classes of society. We still tend to think of any Catholic activity as 'Catholic Action'. But for laymen to take their 'share in the Apostolate of the Hierarchy' requires definite training, based on prayer, a study of the Gospels and of their own surroundings. This postulates the time and devoted attention of priests.

We understand the conversion of the individual, praying man. But the Church seeks to convert the whole man, the working, social man as well. French Catholics are fishing with a net as well

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as a line. If you only convert the individual, he is either taken out of his conditions and cannot be an apostle in them, or he is in danger of relapsing through the pressure of surrounding society. In missionary countries a whole block of people is converted and they are left in their own surroundings. The chief aim of the French movements seems to be the conversion of social *institutions* by living the full Christian life in the *workers'* conditions, which are quite different conditions from those where the parish is 'bourgeois'. Père de Foucauld would seem to be the spiritual father of these French developments. He led his life of Christian charity in the desert among the Touaregs and as a Touareg. He made no conversions in his lifetime, but now the desert is blossoming.

DOM RALPH RUSSELL.

Journal d'un Catéchumène by Dr J. Jouvenroux. Pp. 206. *Les Trois Tentations de l'Apostolat Moderne* by Henry Duméry. Pp. 162 (Collection 'Rencontres' Nos 27 and 28: Éditions du Cerf, Paris) 180 and 200 frs.

IT was the contention of the Abbé Godin that the ordinary parochial organization was inadequate in face of the extensive de-Christianization of modern France. It envisaged a community that was mainly Christian, and it was ill-adapted for any large scale missionary activity. Furthermore, the Abbé found that many souls on entering the Church became, to some extent, declassed. They abandoned, and were abandoned by, their own milieu but found no natural home within the parish. Some sort of catechumenate was needed in which souls could find mutual support in their growth to a fully Christian life, in a gradual transformation, not an abandonment, of their milieu. It was in the light of such ideas that he founded the 'Mission de Paris', under the auspices of Cardinal Suhard, Archbishop of Paris. Dr Jouvenroux, though concerned with his own personal experience, writes as a member of a group whose position, vis-à-vis the parish, he likens to those of the Mission de Paris. 'N'y trouvant plus une communauté fraternelle, nous la cherchons à côté'. In his 'bourgeois' Christian milieu he can find no authentic values. He describes his discovery of them in a process of becoming more fully alive, more *engagé*. 'Rien ne me vient que par l'Humain . . . C'est là pour moi le problème capital: assumer la vie' At the same time he develops an increasing desire for God, a truer appreciation of the Church, and a realization that the life of prayer must be the basis of everything. 'La vie mystique est restée en quelque sort un peu dans les

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laboratoires monacaux. Le problème crucial que L'Église a à trancher dans la crise actuelle me semble être l'insertion de la vie surnaturelle dans une vie humaine qui ne soit pas exceptionnelle, qui ne soit pas vécue en laboratoire, mais qui soit la vie de tous les jours d'un homme moderne qui assume sa tâche humaine de fourmi.' The book contains two further short 'témoignages': 'La Découverte de L'Esprit', by E. Borye, an ex-prisoner of war, and 'Misère en Bourgeoisie,' by J. Franc.

In the second of these two volumes the author, using the analogy of our Lord's three temptations, is concerned to expose the true nature of the apostolate and to suggest the direction of its proper development. It must beware of any taint of pragmatism, and it must avoid a certain messianism in its attitude to the world. It should not make use of modern propagandist methods, for these, of their nature, offend against the freedom of conscience. The apostolate is 'an affair of liberation, not of conquest'. It is of the order of grace and charity and in that order cannot but be efficient, but if it once loses its purity of spirit it becomes essentially anti-Christian and sacrilegious. The expansion of the Church is not merely an affair of numbers. Yet 'on baptise sans hesiter les enfants des familles les plus déchristianisées, trop heureux de grossir un registre de baptême, comme si le nombre importait d'abord'. And many children admitted into the Church in such conditions will grow up with no religious or moral education whatsoever. The general trend of the apostolate, as the author sees it, must make for an ever clearer distinction, though not separation, between religious and secular. The clergy must gradually be relieved of much work that is not specifically spiritual—he mentions works of charity, education etc.—and must aim to bring into being a fully adult Catholic laity, capable of playing a responsible, non-confessional, part in the temporal world. The Catholic, as such, has no part in secular affairs; but as a man he has an urgent duty to take his full share in every sphere of social life. The author instances the 'schools' question as a case in point, and maintains that the issue here is not truly confessional. Catholics must fight this matter out as members of families, on a level with other families, for the rights of the family. The City of God will triumph not in its opposition to, but in its incarnation in, the City of Man. And this incarnation is itself a twofold movement, intensive as well as extensive, and will involve a great effort of reflexion and of intellectual and spiritual 'approfondissement'.

No doubt written with the French apostolate most clearly in

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view, this little book goes beyond the accidents of place and time, and is worthy of attention. It contains a brief address from Cardinal Saliège, Archbishop of Toulouse, and a prefatory letter from Fr Maydiou, O.P., editor of *La Vie Intellectuelle*.

DOM JOHN ROBERTS.

Existentialism and Modern Man (Aquinas Papers, No 9) by F. C. Copleston, S.J. Pp. 28 (Blackfriars, Oxford) 1s. 6d.

The Philosophy of Existence by Gabriel Marcel, translated by Many Harari. Pp. 96 (The Harvill Press) 5s.

EXISTENTIALISM, Fr Copleston tells us, has Man as its principal theme. (That is surely a good thing. It is at least the right start, avoiding the morasses of logical abstraction on the one hand and of idle curiosity—sometimes called ‘the scientific spirit’—on the other.) ‘Given the breakdown of the classical metaphysical systems’, says Fr Copleston with his admirable historical sense, ‘and given the character of the natural sciences it was, I think, only to be expected that there should be a movement in philosophy towards concentration on more human problems with which science is not in a position to deal.’ He goes on to make the familiar contrast between existentialism with its concern for the freedom of the individual and Marxism, but he sets it in a wide historical context (the old individualism leading to Hegelianism, Kierkegaard and Marcel revolting against Hegelianism) which gives it a special interest. It is all delightfully clear, the work of a philosophical historian who is a first-class teacher. ‘Sartre and Camus accept the “death of God” and draw the consequences for human existence, Jaspers and Marcel rediscover the Transcendent, from the standpoint of human existence.’ This summing-up of the next section, even without the careful analysis which it contains, strikes the nail on the head. Fr Copleston adds ‘But it is noticeable that for neither of them is there any question of proving (in the Scholastic sense) the existence of God’. The last section develops this point. It begins with another of those historical sketches which are Fr Copleston’s speciality, a comparison between the philosophical situation at the close of the Middle Ages and that of our own time. Existentialism involves ‘a rejection of metaphysics in the traditional sense in favour of subjectivism’. It is a ‘philosophy of crisis’ reflecting the existing world situation. ‘If Europe escapes the threatening danger, a more objective rational foundation for her future culture will be required.’ Fr Copleston is far from being unsympathetic to existentialism, yet one may

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perhaps suggest that its importance is greater than he allows. 'Proving (in the Scholastic sense) the existence of God' has not been a very fruitful business. 'Metaphysics in the traditional sense' has shown a marked tendency to lose contact with its roots in human experience. If philosophy is the analysis of this experience, such work as that of Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel should be of great service to us in redressing the balance. Fr Copleston warns us against seeking our answer 'in a metalogical sphere.' But is 'a rational foundation' all that is required? Isn't it one of the lessons of history that without the 'intuition of being', the apprehension of God, rational discourse is its own destruction?

Marcel has been fortunate in having Mme Harari as the translator of the four essays which have appeared from the Harvill Press under the title of *The Philosophy of Existence*. To say that he writes 'with great simplicity' is a little misleading, for the direction of his thought is sometimes elusive. But there is hardly a passage which Mme Harari does not make as clear as it can be made, and her power of rendering highly idiomatic French by correspondingly idiomatic English is outstanding. It is impossible to set out Marcel's position in a series of propositions. The only way in which I can indicate what I believe to be its importance is by quotation from the first essay 'on the Ontological Mystery':

'Being is—or should be—necessary. It is impossible that everything should be reduced to a play of successive appearances which are inconsistent with each other ("inconsistent" is essential), or, in the words of Shakespeare, to "a tale told by an idiot." I aspire to participate in this being, in this reality—and perhaps this aspiration is already a degree of participation, however rudimentary.

Such a need, it may be noted, is to be found at the heart of the most inveterate pessimism. Pessimism has no meaning unless it signifies: it would surely be well if there were being, but there is no being, and I, who observe this fact, am therefore nothing.

As for defining the word 'being', let us admit that it is extremely difficult. I would merely suggest this method of approach: being is what withstands—or what would withstand—an exhaustive analysis bearing on the data of experience and aiming to reduce them step by step to elements increasingly devoid of intrinsic or significant value' (pp. 4-5).

'It might be said, by way of an approximation, that my inquiry into being presupposes an affirmation in regard to which I am, in a sense, passive, and of which I am the stage rather than the subject. But this is only at the extreme limit of thought, a limit which I

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cannot reach without falling into contradiction. I am therefore led to assume or to recognize a form of participation which has the reality of a subject; this participation cannot be, by definition, an *object* of thought; it cannot serve as a solution—it appears beyond the realm of problems: it is meta-problematical' (p. 8).

'I am convinced, for my part, that no ontology—that is to say, no apprehension of ontological mystery in whatever degree—is possible except to a being who is capable of recollecting himself, and of thus proving that he is not a living creature pure and simple, a creature, that is to say, which is at the mercy of its life and without a hold upon it' (p. 12).

But these passages must be read in their context if their true value is to be appreciated.

The second essay is a brilliant analysis of Sartre's negative existentialism. 'It is clear that the whole of this dialectic, with its undeniable power and agility, rests upon the complete denial of *we* as subject, that is to say upon the denial of communion. For Sartre this word has no meaning at any possible level, not to speak of its religious or mystical sense. This is because, in his universe, participation itself is impossible: this, philosophically, is the essential point. There is room only for appropriation, and this in a domain where appropriation is impracticable or where, if it is achieved, it fails of its object' (pp. 54-5).

The third essay investigates 'testimony': 'the point is that testimony is given before a transcendence, perhaps even before transcendence itself' (p. 69). The volume concludes with 'An Essay in Autobiography' in which Marcel's horror of systematization offers some excuse for those who consider him a mere 'subjectivist'.

DOM ILLTYD TRETHOWAN.

L'Hagiographie cistercienne dans le diocèse de Liège au XIIIe siècle (Université de Louvain, Recueil de travaux d'histoire et de philologie, 3e sér., 27e fasc.), by Sister Simone Roisin, of the Institute of the Child Jesus, Dr en philosophie et lettres. Pp. 301 (Louvain, Bibliothèque de l'Université, 1947) 180 frs.

EVEN in the English-speaking world, hagiography is nowadays unquestionably in favour, as is clear from the many special studies or symposia frequently appearing. It is of capital importance, even in this field, to study the inheritance of the past according to the rules of sound criticism. Though the work under review is strictly limited, according to its title, as to time, space, and category—thirteenth century, the diocese of Liège as it then

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was, and the Cistercian world—it will not fail to appeal to all those students of mediæval hagiography who are not content with mere approximations or popular works. If they are not likely to find in this book evidence directly relevant to their own subject, they will find an excellent method, a pattern to reproduce, in the ever hard and embarrassing task of deciding what is to be retained from a mediæval biography, whether it be facts to be related, or else, indirectly, sidelights on theological thought, ascetic or mystical or religious ideals, and contemporary civilization.

Sister Roisin has been trained in the University of Louvain to follow a severe and safe method, one which knows how to use the slightest clue and insert it in its proper place, and how to make out of what is conventional those tiny traits by which a seemingly insignificant theme becomes actual. It is not our intention to gather together here all the interesting conclusions of Sister Roisin: we will mention only a few in broad lines, leaving it to the reader to go and seek inspiration from the book itself. But we must emphasize that such a study goes beyond a merely literary pattern, and is of a nature to shed new light on more than one historical problem. The Author says somewhere that these literary productions bear the mark of the scriptoria whence they came: this is perfectly true, and we may be permitted to add that they constitute an important contribution to our knowledge of Cistercian circles in the thirteenth century.

The dossier upon which Sister Roisin has based her inquiries contains some twenty biographies of monks and nuns of holy repute, and she introduces us to these at the beginning of her work, giving in each instance all useful information about the type, the author, its critical value, and everything likely to aid a sound appreciation of the work. Sister Roisin possesses a wonderful mastery of her documentation and of the relevant literature, and all that she groups into three sections: first the ideal of perfection imposed upon the Cistercians; next, the themes favoured in Cistercian circles; and then the method and procedure of the hagiographers. It is clear that the sanctity at which the Cistercians aim is not one which is marked out by miracles, extraordinary phenomena such as would command men's attention. Rather, it consists in absolute fidelity to the Rule, in poverty, austerity, humility, obedience and an interior life of great intensity. The perfect monk seeks spiritual favours, but he dreads whatever might call attention to himself. Sanctity is also known by its mystical side, by union with God as realized mainly in contemplation. Thus

we can realize that the sanctity of Cistercian monasteries is not the result of any easy-going spirituality, but of one very robust as well as very simple. It owes much to St Bernard, which is but natural, and it is indebted also to the Beguines, those *mulieres religiosae* living a common life in the world, as opposed to cloistered nuns, for whose spiritual life the Cistercians made themselves responsible, and from whose spirituality they benefited in return (the author has already studied this point in *Revue d'Histoire ecclésiastique*, 1943, Vol. XXXIX, pp. 342-78). It is a transitional spirituality—one which recalls the affective mysticism of St Bernard while it announces the speculative mysticism of the fourteenth century: from a tender devotion to our Lord's humanity and to our Lady it rises to a sublime contemplation of the Divinity.

The second part also is important. In turn, it studies the various kinds of themes to which the hagiographers so readily have recourse: themes that act as stimulants to monastic asceticism and perfection; themes drawing their inspiration from mysticism and particular devotions; themes that are charismatic or eschatological. The author succeeds in a skilful classification of all these elements which lay scattered in her documents; but what is more important is the keen judgment she brings to bear upon their value. For it is always an awkward question, when we are faced by some theme, to decide whether we are concerned merely with an *exemplum* that lacks any other purpose than that of giving greater finish to the literary product or whether in fact there is a reality corresponding to this theme in the subject itself. The author's explanation seems to us most sound: indeed, there is an *exemplum*, but we must know what we mean by this term. The tendency of those biographies is definitely towards the edification of the public for whom a model is put forward. Here it should be noted that in this public the author intends to include not only the perfect, those who are saints, but the whole class of monks, nuns, clergy and pious layfolk; these were far more interested in paramystical privileges, in supernatural manifestations that prove a direct contact with God and his saints. But those biographies give none the less a picture of the psychology of those who benefited or thought themselves to benefit by such favours: they may well have been subject to illusions or their biographer may have been mistaken. Yet it remains true that these biographies portray the mentality of Cistercian monasteries and so should not be despised. We must separate the historian's task from that of the theologian, who will decide on the foundations for such claims. Each reflexion

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of the author in this section, written with much ease and keen penetration, deserves our attention, for light is thus shed on many a problem.

The third part is concerned with the literary methods and devices employed by the biographers in shaping their data. Here, too, there is much to be gleaned by all students of mediæval hagiography. Once again we must separate the real from the conventional, but this time in what concerns the form rather than the matter. We may say that it is in the first of these that the biographers show themselves less able, for the plan is too often ill-defined and poorly executed. Seeking to characterize the type of author, Sister Roisin allows them the title of biographer, for they bring forward personal details that are sufficiently precise and numerous to bring out a moral and even a physical personality; often, too, in the eventless life of a monk, it is matter rather than documentation that is lacking. These authors are still more hagiographers by their constant care for the spiritual well-being of their readers. And in their efforts to this end there can be perceived a third aspect of sanctity, half way between that of the perfect—the practice of the monastic virtues and union with God—and that of the rank and file of monks and others who see sanctity above all in extraordinary phenomena: the biographer recognizes sanctity where charity blossoms out into the practice of virtues. Thus it is that his work becomes a sort of treatise on the virtues and, as he is very credulous, he will add to it a host of spiritual anecdotes more or less close to the truth. This is what Sister Roisin calls mystical hagiography.

We can see by this that our author brings to the study of monastic sanctity in the thirteenth century a new light; at the same time she confirms many a point already known in the spheres of monastic economics and of the social history of the period. Throughout her book we find indications on those topics, and in her conclusion we have them all resumed.

We feel that this book merits a wide circulation in English-speaking countries, not merely because of any new light it will cast on the sanctity of the thirteenth century, but also because we have here an admirable model for the detailed study of the historiography of a particular region and period. There is no lack of material in England for similar studies.

DOM HUBERT DAUPHIN

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Disentiser Klostergeschichte. Vol. I, A.D. 700-1512. By Iso Müller. Pp. 284 (Benziger, Einsiedeln, 1942) Frs. 14.30.

DURING the war years there appeared in Switzerland several works connected with monastic history. Not the least among these is the first volume of Dom Iso Müller's history of Disentis. From the earlier monographs he had written on his monastery, we had been led to hope that one day he would publish a full history, and of this the first volume is now before us. His earlier articles appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte* (1933), in the *Bündner Monatsblatt* (1934), and the most important of them, 'Die Anfänge des Klosters Disentis,' in the report of the *Historisch-Antiquarischen Gesellschaft von Graubünden* for 1931. The promise of these earlier monographs is richly fulfilled and Dom Iso has brought a considerable degree of research to the work, as his sources indicate.

Today Disentis, though the oldest, is the least known of the existing Swiss monasteries. Dom Iso's history will, we hope, serve to make it better known. It lies just below the confluence of the upper and middle Rhine in very beautiful country. 'It is impossible to conceive anything more beautifully and sublimely diversified than the view from this place' wrote an English traveller in the last century. The name is derived from 'desertinas', at first applied to the country around alone and then later to the monastery. It bears reference to the isolated position rather than to the nature of the countryside. Disentis is at the northern end of the Lukmanier Pass, the lowest of the passes over the Alps into Italy. Higher up the Rhine is the Oberalp Pass connecting it with the Valais, and with the Rhone. The Rhine provides an opening towards Germany. From this it is clear that a monastery such as Disentis would be open to all the major influences, political and monastic. It is most noteworthy that it succeeded in remaining independent of monastic groupings till the seventeenth century.

Dom Iso's first volume covers the years between 700 and 1512. We see unfolding before us the vicissitudes of a monastery, which began as a hermitage under the Rule of St Columban, till the Benedictine Rule was introduced by Ursicinus c.750. From that time it developed as did the other central European monasteries, but it played a special role in the creation and unification of the present canton of Grisons, and in its relations with the popular movement of the Forest Cantons, which was to lead to the Confederation in 1291 and eventually to the formation of that country which today we call Switzerland.

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Dom Iso rejects the legendary date of 614 for the foundation of Disentis. By this date St Sigisbert had become one of the companions of St Columban and St Gall. He is now known to have come from Luxeuil c.700, and was joined in his solitude by Placidus a Rhæto-roman. Disentis has the very good fortune of possessing the lists of its monks through the 'book of confraternity' with Reichenau. These begin only with the Benedictines; Ursicinus is at the head of the list, just as the list of the St Gall monks is headed by Othmar. It gives us some idea of the varying origin of the recruits. Just as the earliest days had seen a Frank, Sigisbert, with a Rhæto-roman, Placid, so at this time many German names are to be found among the Rhæto-romans. The recruitment of Disentis was influenced by political events, such as the incorporation of Lombardy into the Frankish empire in the ninth century, resulting in an increased use of the Alpine passes, especially the Lukmanier, and the migration of the people of Valais in the twelfth century. After these events Lombards and Valaisians figure in the lists. It was never a very big monastery: Ursicinus began in 765 with about 30 monks, but when the Disentis list was compiled in 810 there was a community of 71 and there were already 93 deceased monks. The numbers at the time of the 'Confraternity' between Bobbio, Disentis, St Gall and Schienen were between 120 and 150, but after this they sank rapidly, as is true of most houses during the Carolingian period.

Disentis cannot be compared with Reichenau or St Gall in the literary field, but the excavations made at the beginning of this century indicate a remarkable church with mosaics dating from the ninth century. Irish influence there certainly is, but it is only through paintings and not direct—the same is true of Reichenau and St Gall. Just as at Hersfeld, St Gall and Weissenburg, the monks at Disentis were great church builders: as many as four were built before 800.

The position of Disentis at the northern end of the Lukmanier Pass conferred on the abbot no small influence. This was both political and monastic. The Lukmanier was used by Otto the Great, and by other sovereigns with their armies after him. This inevitably drew attention to Disentis, and it owed not a little to imperial favour. After the rich endowments of Otto the Great and his son, that rendered possible the restoration after the Saracen invasion, Disentis was considered an imperial 'eigenkloster'. This position did not last long, and during the following years Disentis several times changed its status from imperial to episcopal 'eigenkloster'

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—according to the whims of the reigning Emperor. This position was hardly enviable, and it was to Pope Honorius II and the Papacy that the monastery turned for protection in 1127, though the document according this protection expressly stated '*salva diocesani episcopi reverentia*'. Finally Pope Nicolas III, in a letter to the provost of Coire, in 1278, spoke of Disentis as belonging '*nullo medio*' to the Roman Church. This expression had been the classic formula for exemption since Alexander III. From this time the abbots turned towards Coire and the Forest Cantons, and away from the Habsburg dynasty, which was hostile, and we see them playing an important role in the Upper Rhine Valley. Popular movements were afoot—they had given rise to the Confederation of the Forest Cantons—and inevitably these movements were not without influence on Disentis. In 1395 the Ilanzer Bund came into being; its dominating member was the abbot of Disentis. This Ilanzerbund was the Magna Charta of freedom in the Upper Rhine, and at the same time it defeated that revolutionary movement of the fourteenth century which in 1367 had culminated in the murder of Abbot Buchhorn. Unlike the league between the Forest Cantons, made by subjects alone, this one was concluded by both princes and people. It was to be replaced in 1424 by the Grauer Bund, again under the aegis of an abbot of Disentis, which was to give rise to the present canton of Graubünden (Grisons). The abbot could indeed be called at this time the uncrowned ruler of the Upper Rhine Valley.

We have noted already the confraternities which Disentis made with other monasteries, and its geographical position was a decisive factor in its influence. We may almost speak of a monastic highway stretching from Reichenau and St Gall via Pfäfers and Disentis to Como and Bobbio. Despite the evidence of relations with these monasteries Disentis was largely independent. We do know that in the tenth century they had as abbot a monk of Einsiedeln, and the introduction of the Einsiedeln *Consuetudines* did much to bring Disentis into line with the Einsiedeln reform. Through Einsiedeln the early Cluny influence was felt. Later the abbot of Disentis assisted at the Provincial Chapters at Mainz, but there is no question of associating his house with the reform movements of either Melk or Bursfeld. It remained apart from all groupings until in 1617 it joined the Swiss Congregation.

This first volume closes with three abbots who were Swabians. Despite their origin they continued a policy of collaboration with Coire and the forest Cantons in political matters. During these

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reigns for the first time several parishes were incorporated by the abbey. This period also saw the growth of the pilgrimage to the holy founders, St Placid and St Sigisbert, following on the discovery of the sarcophagus containing their relics. A little later the pilgrimage movement was strengthened by processions of thanksgiving after the victories over the Austrian troops in 1499.

Dom Iso Müller concludes his first volume with the death of Abbot Brugger in 1512. The second volume is to cover the years between 1512 and 1880. The difficulties of the monastery consequent on the defection of its abbot and three monks at the time of the reformation, its entry into the Swiss Benedictine Congregation in 1617, its difficulties with the cantonal authorities in the nineteenth century on monastic questions as well as its position in the resistance to the French troops and its destruction by them in 1799, should make the second volume of exceptional interest. May we express the wish that his second volume may soon appear, and that it may not go the way of the second volume of the history of Einsiedeln by Ringholz?

DOM THOMAS BOOS.

The Book of Saints. A Dictionary of Servants of God canonized by the Catholic Church, compiled by the Benedictine Monks of St Augustine's Abbey, Ramsgate (fourth Edition, revised and enlarged), with a calendar of saints. Pp. 708 (Adam and Charles Black) 25s.

WE heartily welcome this new and enlarged edition of the most reliable dictionary of Saints in the English language. This is not to say that the notices are wholly free from error. We shall have occasion to point out some mistakes, but in a work of such magnitude some inaccuracies of detail are inevitable. By and large, the critical standard is high, and the daily calendar now added increases enormously the value and usefulness of the book. Moreover the Dictionary is splendidly comprehensive. In this respect the title page does far less than justice to a compilation which besides the canonized Saints includes the beatified, those whose cultus has been officially confirmed, and the host whose cultus has been no more than local, tolerated by the Church rather than approved. And there also are saints of the Old Law.

There is however one serious defect not easy to explain. Although the book has been thoroughly revised no account is taken of recent canonizations and beatifications, accessible though they are in the *Acta Apostolicæ Sedis*. The reviewer has found nothing later than 1940. St Margaret of Hungary, therefore, and St Louis Marie Grignon

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de Montfort appear as blessed ; St Nicholas von Flue with no more than a *confirmatio cultus*. And what is more serious those lately beatified do not appear at all.

The mistakes to which we would now call attention are mentioned not in a spirit of carping criticism or to exaggerate their importance but in view of the next edition which must certainly be expected of a book so indispensable to all concerned for devotion or study with hagiography. After her brother's death St Pulcheria did not become regent once more but Empress. Whatever the truth may be about the Martyrs SS. John and Paul, they most certainly did not suffer under Julian the Apostate. We cannot assert that St Catherine of Alexandria was martyred under Maximin Daza. In her case early evidence is totally wanting. Hippolytus of Porto (August 22nd) is most probably identical with St Hippolytus of Rome (August 13th). Pope St Sergius did not condemn the synod of Trullo. He merely refused to sign its decrees, which, however, were tacitly approved for the Eastern Church alone. Aaron is placed in the fifteenth century B.C., his brother Moses in the twelfth. Pr Garstang's excavations at Jericho prove that the former is the correct century. Though St Hugh began the existing cathedral at Lincoln he was very far from completing it. We are not convinced that Palladius's Irish mission was 'a complete failure'. On the contrary we believe that much of the work later attributed to St Patrick, the Patrick Junior of Glastonbury, was in fact accomplished by Palladius, Patrick Senior. St Theodore of Sikion was not the son of an innkeeper but of an imperial messenger, the fruit of his liaison with a prostitute. In his notice of Little St Hugh, Mr Attwater concludes that 'it is impossible to tell whether the Jews were innocent or guilty' of his murder. We must therefore dissent from the misleading assertion that their guilt 'Is a historical fact thoroughly established'. (In the case of William of Norwich the lack of proof is rightly recognized.) The statement that Polycarp was sixty-six years old when he was burned is an obvious slip for the eighty-six years during which he had, he said, served Christ. This fact, however, makes it far more likely that he was the child of Christian parents than St John's convert, as stated here. The behaviour of St Simeon Salus as recorded in his authentic life makes it fairly clear that he did not, as here stated, 'allow himself out of humility to be considered an idiot' but was actually unhinged. No sane saint indulges in grossly indecent pranks. Other recorded facts, however, prove that apart from these intermittent attacks of lunacy he continued the life of heroic holiness which has placed him among

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the Saints. Blessed Peter Chanel was martyred in 1841, not 1889, which, as the notice informs us, was the year of his beatification. It is hardly accurate to call the works of Ruysbroeck, admittedly concerned with mystical theology, 'ascetical', though they do of course contain sections to which that description would rightly be applied. Though Margaret Ward was hanged it was not 'with the usual barbarous accompaniments', for out of regard to decency these were confined to males. The life of Margaret of Hungary in Thurston's edition of Butler's lives, an excerpt from which is attributed to Mr Attwater, was in fact written by Fr Thurston himself. Mr Attwater had no share in any of the volumes before July.

E. I. WATKIN.

Three Byzantine Saints. Contemporary Biographies translated from the Greek by Elizabeth Dawes and Norman H. Baynes. Pp. xiv + 276 (Blackwell) 21s.

BYZANTINE literature is chiefly centred in the life of Constantinople; it is consequently aristocratic and dominated by the traditions of the classical period. The three lives contained in this book—St Daniel the Stylite, St Theodore of Sykeon and St John the Almsgiver—present a picture of life in the provinces and give an impression of the humble country folk of East Rome who had little or nothing to do with urban interests and the imperial court. The lives are all contemporary documents.

The three biographies represent three types of Eastern sanctity. St Daniel the Stylite (d. 493) had his column outside Constantinople and was the most noteworthy successor of St Simeon the Stylite. St Theodore founded a monastery at Sykeon and became bishop of Anastasioupolis. He died in 613. St John the Almsgiver was made patriarch of Alexandria in 611.

The translators tell us that we must not bring to the study of Byzantine asceticism a delicate and queasy stomach; that we must banish from our minds the curious western notion that cleanliness is next to godliness; we must be prepared to accept the virtue of 'alousia', abstention from washing. When we are free of our prejudices we shall be ready to 'sympathize with the devotion which inspired these contemners of the body, who sought through penitential suffering to attain to peace of soul (ataraxia) and through that peace to union with God'.

Such a warning, necessary though it is perhaps, should prepare us for anything. In spite of it, the life of St Daniel is attractive, and a pillar saint turns out to be more interesting than might be

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supposed. His was a homely wisdom and the pilgrims who came to him from far and wide, the sick who sought healing, do not seem to have gone away unsatisfied. The introduction to this life gives a *résumé* of the life of St Simeon and an account of the whole organization of this curious form of eremitical life.

The life of St Theodore is the longest in the book (over 100 pages). As it is one long succession of wonders it is not a little tedious. The last section of the book, the life of St John the Almsgiver, presents the most variety and interest. If St Daniel had his pillar and St Theodore his instruments of penance, St John achieved sanctity amidst other difficulties, for he came to Alexandria when Monophysism was rampant, having been elected patriarch although he was a layman and a widower. He died in 619. What the other saints achieved through great penance done to their body, he did through almsgiving.

Amidst the wonders, the penances, the counsel and the almsgiving one other point emerges: the position of the 'saint' in the humbler walks of byzantine society of those days. His services were not confined to the other world—though in connexion with it he appears to have been more sought after than the priest—but even in this world he was a help in time of trouble, a defender of the humble against the injustice of the powerful; he would even admonish Emperors.

As far as can be judged these three lives have been carefully translated; there is an adequate introduction and sufficient notes to explain the ordinary readers' difficulties with the text.

L. C. SHEPPARD.

Chaucer's World compiled by Edith Rickert and edited by Clair Olson and Martin Crow. Pp. xxi + 456 (Oxford University Press) 30s.

THIS book offers in some 500 extracts a fascinatingly varied and interesting account of the religious, social and artistic background of fourteenth century England. The materials were collected by the late Miss Rickert in the fourteen years she spent in searching for any relevant detail of Chaucer's environment she could discover; most of the material has not been published before, or has not before appeared in English, or has been virtually unknown to the general reader. Translations and modernized texts are used throughout the book, so that although the specialist will find much to interest him, the work could hardly have been more helpfully adapted to the needs of the non-specialist reader.

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Through the extracts, illustrations from mediæval manuscripts and introductory historical notes we are given a vivid picture of London Life, the Home, Training and Education, Careers, Entertainments, Travel, War, the Rich and the Poor, Religion, and Death and Burial.

A few quotations will illustrate the variety of the information the book provides. A charming letter to Sir Edmund de Stonor from his chaplain, when on a visit to Sir Edmund's son who was away from home at school, is cited by Miss Rickert as evidence that there were boarding schools run by lay people in England as early as 1380. The chaplain had 'never seen a boy get such care as he has had during his illness. The master and his wife prefer that some of his clothes should be left at home, because he has far too many, and fewer would be enough; and his clothes, through no fault of theirs, might easily be torn and spoiled'.

The tribulations of a music student over his *Graduale* are described in some verses written about 1325. The novice is told that

Thou doest not sing the notes; thou bitest them asunder;

Hold them up, for shame; thou lettest them all under!

The early fifteenth century *Tale of Beryn* is an attempt to continue Chaucer's incomplete *Canterbury Tales*. The following extract describes, in a 'rhythm as bad in the original as in the modernization', the behaviour of some of the pilgrims when they have arrived at Canterbury:

'The Pardoner and the Miller and the other stupid sots
Went wandering about the church just like silly goats,
Peered fast and pored, on the glass above them high,
Counterfeiting gentlemen, blazoning heraldry,
Pointing out the painter and the story with as deep
Understanding of the matter as old horned sheep.'

Other extracts relate the scandal caused by some women 'from the more handsome and the more beautiful but not the better ones, of the entire kingdom', who appeared in 'the diverse and marvellous dress of a man' to fight in a tournament, at which they were only prevented from appearing by 'heavy rainstorms . . . and the fury of diverse extraordinary tempests', and the punishment which befell a woman who had 'popped, painted, plucked, and farded her head'.

It must be left to the historian to decide how judiciously the selections from sources have been made, but one may safely say that seldom has so much research been so attractively presented.

DOM HILARY STEUERT.

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André Gide and the Crisis of Modern Thought by Klaus Mann. Pp. 208 (Dennis Dobson, Ltd.) 15s. net.

THIS is a deplorable book which, one fears, reflects a good deal of discredit on its publishers. Claimed by them as being both an analysis of the work of André Gide and as a biography, it is in fact neither. It is an extraordinary hotchpotch of innuendo, scandal, and gossip about its subject, containing a description of various works of his with no attempt at criticism, and including some remarks of almost unbelievable banality which he is said to have made at widely assorted times and places. The whole work is written in the style of the modern publicity agent and is at all times unpleasant to read and very often offensive.

Mr Mann is ambitious. He says in his preface that 'Gide's work is a microcosm that involves the complete scope of modern man's experiences and obsessions' (p. 7), and he goes on in the first chapter to relate that microcosm to the literary and cultural scene of Paris at the end of the 1914-18 War. To do that he has to link Gide with the other literary figures of his time. It is in this section that the author's Holywooden English is to be seen at its ripest. Let us illustrate his critical observations in some detail.

Paul Claudel. 'An eerie twilight prevails in the dome of his work; everything is bathed in a solemn and sombre purple' (p. 12).

Henri de Montlerant. 'The spirited bard of bull fights and of other forms of sublime sadism' (p. 14).

In Colette's work 'The lascivious secrets of the boudoir assume a flavour of serene innocence' (p. 14).

Rimbaud 'the seditious vagabond, unmasked, mercilessly, the cracks and the corruptions of our way of life' (p. 11).

That is not all we learn from this first chapter. We learn that the international cultured bourgeois after the 1918 war considered that 'the French genius was represented by Voltaire's acrid wit and the admirable legs of La Mistinguette'; we learn that in 1925 Curtius told Klaus Mann that Gide 'is an unusually nice old chap', that he has sudden disconcerting twinkles in his eyes 'which come as an uncanny flash, like a warning sign from the volcanic depth of his being'; that 'he is a bit of an actor'; that he considers 'cigarettes devilish enough' but not as bad as narcotics; and various other details about his life that it would be inappropriate to mention in the pages of this periodical. Quotations are included from his '*Journal*', the banality of which can perhaps be sufficiently seen from the following: 'Curious, this disposition

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to impolite obstinacy which often results from headache' and 'Ma valeur est dans ma complication'.

Having popped Gide in his rightful cultural context, Mr Mann proceeds on his dreary chronological way through Gide's life and work. He remarks with some complacency that Gide 'had sins to confess even when still a child'; that he was lonely as a child and haunted by guilt; that he used to cry 'je ne suis pas pareil aux autres'. These biographical details cannot be offensive perhaps to anyone but Gide, but have no relevance to what is perhaps the only question which an English reader is likely to be interested in 'To what does Gide owe his reputation and why should translations of his works still be appearing in this country?' Such a question will find no answer in this book. All that the reader will get is illustrated by the remark about Gide's development after his trip to North Africa 'His emotion is no longer fastidious, but it has become cosmic, comprehensive, billow-like'. And billow-like and rampant (a favourite word in Mr Mann's critical vocabulary) it remains right down to the end.

Much of the later part of the book is spent in discussing Gide's various *volte-faces* with regard to the Soviet Union. In 1932 he wrote in his journal 'I do not want my journal to deal exclusively with the Soviet Union. And yet there seems to be nothing else I am really interested in.' Mann's comment on his propagandist message to the 'Committee for the World Congress of Youth against War and Fascism' is 'No wonder that the public was astounded to hear so fierce and primitive a jargon from André Gide, the matchless master of suggestive overtones and iridescent subtleties'. No wonder, too, that Mann should say that when Gide had written his essay 'L'U.R.S.S.', and was abused by the Communists, at their next meeting 'his eyes narrowed to two glimmering slits, the cigarette dangling from his lips'. That sentence illustrates the affinities of this supposedly critical work with what Mr George Orwell once referred to as the 'Ballast' type of American fiction.

It seems to be the duty of any responsible critic to say that this book is worthless. If he says that he must ask two further questions: 'Why was it published and for whom was it intended?' If there is a public for this kind of book, there must be a large number of people in this country who profess an interest in literature and who are unable to distinguish between an American Crime thriller and a novel by Mr Koestler. They must be a wealthy public if they pay 15s. for such a book as this. The answer to the other question is even more difficult. Can it be that a publisher whose business

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is to produce books really thinks that this kind of chit-chat is a serious critical work, or that this book will make a profit without undermining his reputation? Or is publishing today also conducted on the basis of quick returns?

D. V. HENRY.

SHORTER NOTICES

St Augustine. The Lord's Sermon on the Mount. Translated by the Very Rev. J. J. Jepson, S.S., PH.D. with an Introduction and Notes by the Editors. (Ancient Christian Writers: the Works of the Fathers in Translation. Edited by J. Quasten, S.T.D. and J. C. Plumpe, PH.D.). Pp. 227 (The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.; The Mercier Press) 15s.

IT should be good news for Catholics in this country that one of the two series of translations of the Fathers at present being produced in America is now available here through the Mercier Press, Cork. Reading the Fathers ought to be a normal part of the life of every thinking Catholic. After the Bible, they are the best of spiritual reading and the source of theological wisdom: though like the Bible they need reading intelligently, with the help at times of some sufficient commentary. Now Catholics in this country who do not read Latin or Greek have at their disposal a reliable translation, in good English and provided, to judge from the present volume, with really excellent notes. It is the notes which make the present series preferable to the other American production, *The Fathers of the Church* (see THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW Summer 1948, p. 331), in which the translations are also very good but the notes, though giving very clearly the necessary minimum of guidance, are not adequate for serious study. In the present volume the notes, though by no means clumsily long or overweighted with unnecessary erudition, give a remarkable amount of guidance and information and put what St Augustine says in this treatise in its proper context. The references to modern literature on the subjects dealt with cover a wide field, both Catholic and non-Catholic, American, English and Continental, and should be of help to the most serious students who are not already advanced Augustine scholars. It is to be hoped that some day translations and notes in this series will be reprinted with the Greek or Latin text.

St Augustine's treatise on the Sermon on the Mount is a good example of his method of explaining the Scriptures and an admirable

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introduction to Christian morals and the Christian life written, like so much in the Fathers, for ordinary people and still serviceable for them. It is most profitable spiritual reading and would make a good basis for a course of sermons.

Ideas of Divine Rule in the Ancient East by C. J. Gadd, F.B.A. Pp. 101 (Schweich Lectures of the British Academy for 1945. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege) 7s. 6d.

THE importance of the background of Middle Eastern and Near Eastern ideas for understanding the ruler-worship of Hellenistic and Roman times is now coming to be generally realized. Mr Gadd's Schweich Lectures provide a clear, scholarly and interestingly written introduction to this remote but extremely influential world of ideas. He deals with Mesopotamia and the adjacent regions, including Israel, primarily, and with Egypt more or less incidentally. His book should be of value both to Biblical and classical scholars. He gives an account, copiously illustrated with examples, of the ideas of those regions about the rule of the gods over other gods and men, about the relationship of the kings to the gods, and about the attitude of the peoples in general to their divine and human rulers and the means which they adopted to find out the mind of the gods towards them (the various forms of divination). The clear distinction which he establishes between the Egyptian view of the king as himself a god and the Mesopotamian view that he is the god's steward or bailiff on earth is of great importance for students of the later history of ruler-worship and the divine right of kings. Another interesting feature of the book is that, though the author stresses every faintest hint or suggestion in the Bible which may be interpreted to bring the Israelite conception of God into line with those of neighbouring peoples, the originality of the Biblical account of God and his dealings with men emerges very clearly from his account.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

Our Mother Church. Her Worship and Offices by C. Zvegintzov. Pp. 126 (S.P.C.K.) 3s. 6d.

THIS little paper-covered book gives an account of Russian Orthodox public worship; it treats, consequently, of the byzantine liturgy, the various feasts and fasts of the year, the administration of the sacraments. It is exclusively Russian in approach (a note on the title page informs us that it was compiled from standard Russian textbooks) and on that account is not a

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complete guide to byzantine usage (thus on pp. 109-10 in speaking of absolution only an indicative formula is noted, whereas a deprecativ form is the traditional byzantine usage except among the Russians). Some of the statements are, to say the least, inadequate. Thus to state that 'The Russians and other Slav Churches received Christianity from Greece' is to tell the truth, indeed, but not all the truth by any means. Here and there signs of a certain Anglican influence and terminology may be perceived. This book may serve well enough the purpose for which it was intended—the instruction of Russian Orthodox children in England. Others will find Donald Attwater's three books or, in French, the comprehensive *La Prière des Eglises de Rite Byzantin* by Dom Mercenier and Canon Paris more satisfying. It is to be wished, though, that a book on the Roman rite on the lines of *Our Mother Church* could be produced; a simple and short book concerned with the worship of the Church and teaching religion through the presentation of that worship—Mass, Office, sacraments, the Church's year—would be extremely useful besides being a novelty.

L. C. SHEPPARD.

The Two Trees by Gerald Vann, O.P. Pp. 48 (Collins) 2s. 6d.

THE four chapters of this little book deal mainly with the place of suffering in the life of the Christian. It should be sufficient recommendation to say that the tact and sympathy with which Fr Vann treats his subject are unusually persuasive and encouraging.

Life of Mother Janet Stuart by Pauline Smith-Steinmetz. Pp. 179 (Clonmore and Reynolds) 6s.

THOSE who wish to learn the main facts about Mother Stuart's life and who are unable to read Mother Monahan's indispensable *Life and Letters* will find this short biography useful. Inevitably any book so limited in scope as this must miss much of the charm and value which Mother Stuart's admirable letters, conversations and spiritual direction give to the longer study by Mother Monahan.

DOM HILARY STEUERT.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

BON SAUVEUR (Lombard, Albi):

Le Dogme de la Rédemption dans la Théologie Contemporaine (J. Rivière) 800 frs.

BRUCE HUMPHRIES, INC. (Boston):

Alice Meynell Centenary Tribute (ed. T. L. Connolly, s.j.) n.p.

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE:

The Origins of the Great Schism (W. Ullmann) 18s.

Margaret of Cortona (F. Mauriac: tr. Barbara Wall) 9s. 6d.

A Bedside Book of English Saints after A.D. 1066 (A. Roche) 6s.

The Catholic Doctor—Fourth Edition (A. Bonnar, O.F.M.) 8s. 6d.

DESSAIN (Malines):

Les Rites et Prières du Saint Sacrifice de la Messe—Vol. I, Second Edition (A. Croegaert) 200 frs.

DISTRIBUTIST BOOKS:

An Essay on the Restoration of Property (H. Belloc)—Second Edition. 2s. 6d.

DOBSON:

Interest and Usury (B. W. Dempsey: intro. D. A. Schumpeter) 12s. 6d.

The Man Nearest to Christ (F. L. Filas, s.j.) 12s. 6d.

EDITIONS DU CERF:

Ethérie, Journal de Voyage (tr., intro. and ed. H. Pétré) 400 frs.

La Saint Bible: Aggée, Zacharie, Malachie (tr. A. Gelin, p.s.s.);

Les Livres des Maccabées (tr. T. M. Abel, O.P.); *L'Evangile selon Saint Luc* (tr. E. Osty, p.s.s.) n.p.

EDITIONS DE MAREDSOUS:

Histoire de l'Ordre de Saint Benoît—Vols III and IV (Dom Ph. Schmitz) n.p.

HARVILL PRESS:

Kierkegaard the Cripple (T. Haecker; tr. C. von O. Bruyn; intro. A. Dru) 5s.

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HERDER (Vienna):

Die Macht des Reinen Herzens (D. Schneider) S.18.40.

Missarum Solemnia—2 Vols (A. Jungmann, s.J.) S.142 (\$16.20).

HOLLIS AND CARTER:

St Paul, Envoy of Grace (R. Sencourt) 16s.

OFFICIUM LIBRI CATHOLICI (Rome):

La Connaissance Humaine et sa Valeur Critique (L. Veuthey) n.p.

De Verbo Incarnato et de B. V. Maria (C. L. Larnicol, c.s.SP.) n.p.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS:

The Literature of the Old Testament—Second Edition (G. F. Morse and L. H. Brockington) 5s.

The New Testament Doctrine of the 'Last Things' (H. A. Guy) 10s. 6d.

Arthurian Torso (Ch. Williams; ed. C. S. Lewis) 12s. 6d.

The Suffering Servant in Deutero-Isaiah (C. R. North) 15s.

S.C.M. PRESS:

The Dilemma of the Arts (W. Weidlé; tr. M. Jarrett-Kerr) 10s.

SHEED AND WARD:

The Human Wisdom of St Thomas (ed. J. Peiper; tr. D. MacLaren, O.P.) 6s.

The Meaning of Man (J. Mouroux; tr. A. H. C. Downes) 12s. 6d.

Paradox in Chesterton (H. Kenner) 7s. 6d.

The Face of the Saints (W. Schamoni; tr. A. Fremantle) 21s.

TRAFTON PUBLISHING COY (Lexington, Ky):

Apostolic Succession and Anglicanism (F. L. Cirlot) n.p.

Christ and Divorce (F. L. Cirlot) n.p.

UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL PRESS (Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd):

The Poems of William Habington (ed. K. Allott) 15s.

COMMENTARY

THERE has been no space under this heading so far for any account of the German theological scene. The following introduction to the subject has been contributed by Mr A. H. Armstrong: The intellectual activity of German Catholics at the present time is very remarkable, especially considering their material difficulties, and in many ways provides examples which we in this country might follow. The following instances of what is being done in Hamburg are particularly relevant for ourselves, because the situation of Catholics there is in some ways very like our own. The Hamburg Catholics are a minority of 90,000 in a population of one and a half million, living in a general atmosphere of negative materialist irreligion and tolerant indifference of a sort rather unusual in Germany but very like that of England. There exists in Hamburg an admirable scheme of Catholic adult education called the Augustinuswerk, intended to give a deep understanding of Catholic faith, life and culture to all serious enquirers, Catholic and non-Catholic together. It provides eight weekly courses of lectures, covering Scripture, Biblical and Dogmatic Theology, Liturgy, Church History, Church Music and Christian Art, Literature and Catholic Social Teaching. Scripture, Theology and Liturgy are emphasized as the fundamental studies, without a grounding in which the study e.g. of Catholic social teaching is not likely to be profitable. The total number enrolled for all these courses is about 300, of all religions or none and drawn from all classes of society. The Augustinuswerk also provides occasional public lectures by visiting lecturers on questions of the day (average attendance about 500). The group of 'Friends' actively engaged in or supporting the work have a weekly Sung Mass and Compline, regular more advanced study-circles (one always devoted to a work of St Augustine) and other social and cultural activities. They are beginning to extend their activities to the isolated Catholic communities of Schleswig-Holstein. The movement is founded and directed by a priest, Dr Sigge, and one other priest is active in it, but all the other lecturers are laymen, or women in very various walks of life—e.g., the lecturer on Liturgy is a clerk in the Hamburg Finance Department.

In the University of Hamburg there are about 500 at least nominally Catholic students out of a total of 5,000; of these about 150 take an active part in the life of the Chaplaincy. A great part of their energies is necessarily taken up with the material struggle for existence and with helping to feed and clothe the poorer

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members of their student community. But their programme of spiritual and intellectual formation is as follows: Community (i.e., Dialogue or congregationally sung) Masses on Sunday mornings and Tuesday evenings: three weekly and one fortnightly lecture and discussion-courses, on Dogmatic Theology, Philosophy (the theory of knowledge was recently the subject) Literature, and Politics and Economics. Dogmatic Theology is overwhelmingly the most popular, with seventy attending as against ten to twenty-five in the other courses. In addition regular public lectures are given in University lecture-rooms and under the auspices of the University, by the Student Chaplain and others, at which some of the audience are non-Catholics. There are also weekly social evenings which continue out of term and sometimes include discussions which take a serious turn.

Nouvelle Revue Théologique for September-October 1948 contains an article on the liberty of Christ by P. Durand, S.J., of Lyon-Fourvière. P. Durand begins by reminding us that we must distinguish between 'mysteries' properly so-called, statements in human terms of revealed divine truth, and 'mysteries' in which the theologian becomes involved by falling into anthropomorphism. The present question is: can we think of Christ as both *impeccable* and at the same time as freely accepting death on the Cross in obedience to his Father? Some theologians have argued that Christ was not *obliged* by his Father to accept death; therefore he was free to refuse it without sin. Others, considering that Christ's impeccability follows from the Beatific Union, have sought to release some of his acts from the control of the Vision and so to find in them a liberty of indifference. Others, again, abandon the liberty of indifference and claim that it is sufficient to find freedom from compulsion, spontaneity. P. Durand professes to reject all these systems (pp. 814-15), but it is difficult to see how his own solution differs from the third except in so far as he brings out the difference between the merely voluntary and the free: freedom is a self-determination 'a certain power which we have from God to create ourselves . . .' (p. 816). In fact the importance of the article seems to lie in P. Durand's reasons for accepting the third system in so far as it repudiates a 'liberty of indifference' in Christ. 'Christ was fully free . . . *although* he could do no evil, and indeed his liberty was perfect *because* he could do no evil. That is, his liberty . . . was not a liberty of indifference and of choice, but a *liberty without option*' (p. 818).